SYNOPSIS Finding qualified accounting staff has consistently been a top issue facing CPA firms. However, little is known about the factors that influence accountants' decisions to seek careers with different types of firms. In our paper, we use Ajzen's (1991) theory of planned behavior to examine the reasons why some accountants seek careers at Big 4 firms, while other accountants seek careers at non-Big 4 firms. We survey accounting students and find that attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control each influence firm-choice decisions. To provide additional insight into our results, we survey accounting professionals from Big 4 and non-Big 4 accounting firms. We find that, overall, students' perceptions, while more limited, are similar to those of accounting professionals. Further, we find that accounting professionals provide a number of insightful comments that offer several important implications for accounting firms. Finally, we assess whether accounting professionals perceive that certain types of accounting students are more likely to succeed at Big 4 versus non-Big 4 firms, and whether recruiting efforts are consistent with these perceptions. Data Availability: Data are available upon request.

SUMMARY: Accounting research finds that auditors perform better when they are required to account for their actions to a superior. However, this research assumes that the auditor is accountable to one superior, when in practice auditors are accountable to multiple parties who may have multiple performance preferences. In this study, I experimentally examine whether the multiple accountabilities inherent in the audit environment cause auditors to experience negative affect and how negative affect impacts performance on both a low- and high-complexity audit task. I find that when auditors are accountable to multiple superiors they experience significantly more negative affect than when accountable to one superior. In addition, I find that increased negative affect can harm low-complexity audit task performance.

In this case, students are required to audit a company's gross property, plant, and equipment and depreciation expense accounts. Students are provided with electronic working papers that include the audit program, as well as documents prepared by the client and select prior year working papers. In order to successfully complete the audit, students will have to obtain explanations and other assistance from the client. The case furthers audit education by illuminating to students how concepts learned in the classroom translate into practice. The case has several specific learning objectives. First, the case familiarizes students with electronic working papers which allows them to practice their Excel skills. Second, the case provides students with an opportunity to audit property, plant, and equipment additions using substantive details testing and to test depreciation expense using substantive analytical procedures. Third, students must consider internal controls and the implications errors have on internal control effectiveness. Fourth, the case helps students improve documentation skills by writing tick mark explanations. Finally, the case provides students practice with professional verbal communications through client interviews. The case is appropriate for an undergraduate audit or a beginning graduate-level audit and assurance class.

a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o Available online xxxxWe examine the association between economic climate and auditor risk acceptance as measured by the auditors' reaction to internal control weaknesses. We hypothesize and find that auditors address risk in a way that is conditioned on the economic environment. In particular, we find that during periods of weak economic activity, auditors tend to assess lower risk premiums and are less likely to resign in response to an adverse ICFR opinion. However, we find evidence that economic factors do not influence fees assessed by incoming auditors following a resignation in the presence of an ICFR weakness. Our results indicate that auditors modify their engagement risk strategies during challenging economic times and accept higher levels of risk to attract and retain clients. For the riskiest clients, however, economic factors do not appear to influence auditors' risk pricing.