Purpose Environmental turbulence represents a double-edged sword, simultaneously fueling and hindering a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation (EO). Drawing on the theories of EO and network relationships, this study aims to develop and test a conceptual model that provides a nuanced account of the relationship between environmental turbulence and firm EO. Design/methodology/approach Data for this study were collected using a survey of high-technology firms in Hsinchu Science Park (HSP) in Taiwan. Questionnaires were mailed to 297 high-technology firms in the semiconductor, photoelectric and communication industries within HSP. Completed questionnaires were received from 94 firms, which included responses from 94 research and development managers and 462 employees. Findings The results reveal that the degree of environmental turbulence exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with a firm’s EO. Moreover, this relationship is positively moderated by network relationships between firms, but negatively moderated by organizational inertia. Originality/value The empirical and conceptual findings have important implications for understanding EO, because the findings explain causal relationships that transform a firm’s interactive and inner control capabilities into firm-level results.

Purpose Based on agency perspective on temporary agency workers, the purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between firms’ agency problems and agency cost on agency workers; moreover, intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation are considered in seeking to understand how they moderate this relationship. Design/methodology/approach Using the Hsinchu Science Park directory of corporate affiliations as a sample frame, the authors adopted a paired questionnaire which included two parts in order to consider the possible problem of common method variances. The first part is completed by the manager of the firms and the second part is completed by his/her temporary agency workers. Finally, 94 firms completed questionnaires, providing a total sample of 94 R&D managers and 458 temporary agency workers. The rate of participation was 31.65 percent. Findings Using a questionnaire survey of 94 high-tech firms, from which a total of 94 R&D managers and 458 temporary agency workers participated, the results show that firms’ agency problems have a positive influence on the agency cost of monitoring temporary agency workers. In addition, while this relationship is negatively moderated by extrinsic motivation, intrinsic motivation has a non-significant moderating effect. Originality/value The managers of firms should consider not only the short-term flexibility of employing temporary agency workers, but also the long-term cultivation of promoting great agency workers. This could maximize the efficiency of the interaction between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. Of course, the firms should think about how to reduce the agency problems created by goal conflict, information asymmetry and risk sharing with temporary agency workers, because this could also provide a chance for the firms to decrease agency costs spent on monitoring.