We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2):385-393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330-353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required.
We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the space of distributions partially ordered with respect to the first-order stochastic dominance, we prove existence of a greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium. In particular, we obtain our results under a different set of conditions than those in the existing literature. Moreover, we provide computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics with respect to the parameters of the game. Finally, we apply our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, as well as a general class of linear non-atomic games.
We investigate a model of deterministic stochastic choice for the standard consumer problem. We introduce the framework of statistical consumer theory where the individual maximizes their utility with respect to a distribution of bundles that is constrained by a statistic (e.g. mean expenditure). We show that this behavior is observationally equivalent to an individual whose preferences depend only on the statistic of the distribution. Statistical consumer theory neither nests nor is nested in the random utility approach. We provide a formal statistical test of the model accounting for sampling variability and demonstrate it in an illustrative example using data on capuchin monkeys. * We thank Keith Chen for providing access to the data.
The paper presents the methodology of numerical modelling of road crash tests based on the selected vehicle-road barrier system using the possibilities of modern CAD /CAE computing systems for a numerical simulation process of the collision. Owing to these systems, thorough analysis of the process of collision, including the analysis of the stress and strain fields and energy consumption in the tested systems, is possible. It is possible to design and redesign virtually the barriers at a relatively low cost.Streszczenie: W artykule przedstawiono metodykę modelowania numerycznego drogowych testów zderzeniowych na przykładzie wybranego układu pojazddrogowa bariera ochronna, z wykorzystaniem możliwości nowoczesnych systemów obliczeniowych CAD/CAE do numerycznej symulacji przebiegu zderzeń. Dzięki wykorzystaniu tych systemów możliwa jest dogłębna analiza procesu zderzenia, w tym analiza pól naprężeń, odkształceń oraz energochłonności badanych układów. Możliwe jest wirtualne projektowanie i przeprojektowywanie barier przy relatywnie niskich kosztach.Słowa kluczowe: zderzenie, LS-DYNA, PN-EN 1317, metoda elementów skończonych
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