Marital status can both reflect and affect individual preferences. We explore the impact of marriage on corporate chief executive officers (CEOs) and find that firms run by single CEOs exhibit higher stock return volatility, pursue more aggressive investment policies, and do not respond to changes in idiosyncratic risk. These effects are weaker for older CEOs. Our findings continue to hold when we use variation in divorce laws across states to instrument for CEO marital status, which supports the hypothesis that marriage itself drives choices rather than it just reflecting innate heterogeneity in preferences. We explore various potential explanations for why single CEOs may be less risk averse. ABSTRACTStatus concerns can drive risk-taking behavior by affecting the payoff to a marginal dollar of wealth. If status concerns arise endogenously due to competition in the marriage market, then unmarried individuals should take greater risks. We test this hypothesis by studying corporate CEOs. We find that single CEOs are associated with firms exhibiting higher stock return volatility, pursue more aggressive investment policies, and are not affected by increases in idiosyncratic risk. These effects are weaker for older CEOs. Our results also hold when we use variation in divorce laws across states to instrument for CEO marital status.

This paper finds support for the hypothesis that overvalued firms create value for long-term shareholders by using their equity as currency. Any approach centered on abnormal returns is complicated by the fact that the most overvalued firms have the greatest incentive to engage in stock acquisitions. We solve this endogeneity problem by creating a sample of mergers that fail for exogenous reasons. We find that unsuccessful stock bidders significantly underperform successful ones. Failure to consummate is costlier for richly priced firms, and the unrealized acquirer-target combination would have earned higher returns. None of these results hold for cash bids.

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Stock market average returns and Sharpe ratios are significantly higher on days when important macroeconomic news about inflation, unemployment, or interest rates is scheduled for announcement. The average announcement-day excess return from 1958 to 2009 is 11.4 basis points (bp) versus 1.1 bp for all the other days, suggesting that over 60% of the cumulative annual equity risk premium is earned on announcement days. The Sharpe ratio is 10 times higher. In contrast, the risk-free rate is detectably lower on announcement days, consistent with a precautionary saving motive. Our results demonstrate a trade-off between macroeconomic risk and asset returns, and provide an estimate of the premium investors demand to bear this risk. basis points versus 1.1 basis points for all the other days, suggesting that over 60% of the cumulative annual equity risk premium is earned on announcement days. The Sharpe ratio is ten times higher. In contrast, the risk-free rate is detectably lower on announcement days, consistent with a precautionary saving motive. Our results demonstrate a trade-o¤ between macroeconomic risk and asset returns, and provide an estimate of the premium investors demand to bear this risk. Disciplines Finance and Financial Management | Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods2

This paper finds support for the hypothesis that overvalued firms create value for long-term shareholders by using their equity as currency. Any approach centered on abnormal returns is complicated by the fact that the most overvalued firms have the greatest incentive to engage in stock acquisitions. We solve this endogeneity problem by creating a sample of mergers that fail for exogenous reasons. We find that unsuccessful stock bidders significantly underperform successful ones. Failure to consummate is costlier for richly priced firms, and the unrealized acquirer-target combination would have earned higher returns. None of these results hold for cash bids.