Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a strategic field of study that seeks to provide a coastal country with an effective monitoring of its maritime resources and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In this scope, a Maritime Monitoring System (MMS) aims to leverage active surveillance of military and non-military activities at sea using sensing devices such as radars, optronics, automatic Identification Systems (AISs), and IoT, among others. However, deploying a nation-scale MMS imposes great challenges regarding the scalability and cybersecurity of this heterogeneous system. Aiming to address these challenges, this work explores the use of blockchain to leverage MMS cybersecurity and to ensure the integrity, authenticity, and availability of relevant navigation data. We propose a prototype built on a permissioned blockchain solution using HyperLedger Fabric—a robust, modular, and efficient open-source blockchain platform. We evaluate this solution’s performance through a practical experiment where the prototype receives sensing data from a Software-Defined-Radio (SDR)-based low-cost AIS receiver built with a Raspberry Pi. In order to reduce scalability attrition, we developed a dockerized blockchain client easily deployed on a large scale. Furthermore, we determined, through extensive experimentation, the client optimal hardware configuration, also aiming to reduce implementation and maintenance costs. The performance results provide a quantitative analysis of the blockchain technology overhead and its impact in terms of Quality of Service (QoS), demonstrating the feasibility and effectiveness of our solution in the scope of an MMS using AIS data.

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Este trabalho trata da segurança cibernética em um teste de impacto de veículos (crash tests). Um modelo de ataque descreve os principais ataques que podem ser lançados contra os sistemas de sensoriamento e aquisição de dados. Para cada ataque, são apresentadas contramedidas baseadas em metodologias já consolidadas na literatura. Todavia, um desses ataques está relacionado com a dificuldade de se confirmar que os sensores foram de fato embarcados no veiculo durante o teste. Para este ataque é apresentada uma ideia original de emissão de um identificadorúnico para cada sensor usando um dispositivo luminoso e a recuperação deste por uma câmera já utilizada no teste. A factibilidade da ideia é demonstrada por meio de um experimento.