Most political scientists and economists unequivocally accept the proposition that abundant mineral resources are more often a curse than a blessing, particularly for developing countries. We argue that the widely accepted contention that an abundance of mineral resources and the influx of external rents generated from these resources during boom periods are to blame for the so-called "resource curse" should be revisited. Instead, we offer a new research agenda for studying the problem of resource-rich states that shifts the locus of study away from the "paradox of plenty" to a more appropriate paradox-that the concentration of wealth impoverishes the state whereas the dispersion of wealth enriches the state. This agenda focuses on three interrelated issues: the structure of ownership over mineral resources, the importance of strong institutions, and the relative influence of domestic versus international factors. * The authors share equal responsibility for the content and analysis herein. This essay draws extensively from a long-term joint project, and they have chosen to rotate authorship on the publications they generate.

In her gracious and incisive review, Miriam R. Lowi raises three main questions: 1) whether Russia is indeed a case of private domestic ownership (P1); 2) whether there is a fundamental difference between state ownership with control (S1) and without control (S2); and 3) whether we adequately take into account alternative explanations for the variation in ownership structure (OS) across petroleum-rich states over the twentieth century.

Countless studies document the correlation between abundant mineral resources and a series of negative economic and political outcomes, including poor economic performance, unbalanced growth, weakly institutionalized states, and authoritarian regimes across the developing world. The disappointing experience of mineral-rich countries has generated a large body of scholarship aimed at explaining this empirical correlation and a list of prescriptions for combating the resource curse. The most popular solutions emphasize macroeconomic policies, economic diversification, natural resource funds, transparency and accountability, and direct distribution to the general population. The success of these solutions has been limited because they either presuppose strong state institutions, which are widely absent in the developing world, or assume state ownership over mineral wealth and thus the need for external actors to constrain the state. At the same time, domestic private ownership is rarely proposed and often maligned. Yet, in some countries, it would serve as a more viable way to avoid the resource curse by fostering institutions that more effectively constrain state leaders, encouraging them to invest in institution building, and enabling them to respond more successfully to commodity booms and busts.

There is a widespread presumption that Islamists have an advantage over their opponents when it comes to generating mass appeal and winning elections. The question remains, however, as to whether these advantages—or, what we refer to collectively as an Islamist political advantage—actually exist. We argue that—to the extent that Islamists have a political advantage—the primary source of this advantage is reputation rather than the provision of social services, organizational capacity, or ideological hegemony. Our purpose is not to dismiss the main sources of the Islamist governance advantage identified in scholarly literature and media accounts, but to suggest a different causal path whereby each of these factors individually and sometimes jointly promotes a reputation for Islamists as competent, trustworthy, and pure. It is this reputation for good governance that enables Islamists to distinguish themselves in the streets and at the ballot box.