The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPoJ) can be, or otherwise ought to be, regarded as a transcendental phenomenology of hope. Kant states repeatedly that CPoJ mediates between the first two Critiques, or between the theoretical knowledge we arrive at on the basis of understanding and reason's foundational role for practical philosophy. In other words, exercising the power of judgment is implicated whenever we try to bring together the ethical issue of strictly determining our actions on the one hand and the necessity to act in the physical world on the other. We will argue that this mediating function is properly understood only if the ideations produced by self-understanding are characterized as objects of rationally required hope or fear.
Wissenschaft und die Geschichte der Wissenschaften. Begriffliche Innovationen im Zuge der Historisierung der Wissenschaften im 18. Jahrhundert. Die historische Rekonstruktion der Wissenschaften ist auf vielfältige Weise mit philosophischen Diskussionen des 18. Jahrhunderts verknüpft. Insbesondere teilen die Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung und die Historiographie der Wissenschaften das konzeptuelle Problem, eine Vielzahl wissenschaftlicher bzw. philosophischer Praktiken unter einem gemeinsamen Oberbegriff zu versammeln. Die historische Analyse der Entwicklung der Wissenschaften bietet hierzu einen Zugang, in dem die Definition von “Wissenschaft” bzw. “Wissenschaften” ebenso zur Diskussion steht wie die Systematisierung der Wissenschaften. In einer Analyse dieses begrifflichen Problems und einer Typologisierung wissenschaftshistorischer Ansätze des 18. Jahrhunderts wird die enge Interaktion philosophischer und wissenschaftshistorischer bzw. – allgemeiner – wissenschaftsreflexiver Diskurse im 18. Jahrhundert aufgezeigt.
There is a classical paradox in education that also affects the epistemic virtues: the paradox inherent in the demand to develop general strategies for training persons to be free and creative individuals. This problem becomes particularly salient with respect to the epistemic virtue of creativity, the more so if we consider a radical form of creativity, namely, genius. This paper explores a historical constellation in which rigorous claims about the standards for knowledge and morality were developed, along with a highly influential notion of genius: the philosophy of Kant and of immediate post‐Kantian philosophers. The paper shows how in this historical moment came together a new notion of “science,” a theory of “genius” and of virtues, and an analysis of the promises and difficulties inherent in educating a virtuous or creative individual. In this constellation of ideas, there also emerges a potentially fruitful account of how to teach intellectual creativity.
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