Using data from 1996 to 2000, we investigate the effects of ownership, especially by a strategic foreign owner, on bank efficiency for eleven transition countries in an unbalanced panel consisting of 225 banks and 856 observations. Applying stochastic frontier estimation procedures, we compute profit and cost efficiency taking account of both time and country effects directly. In second-stage regressions, we use the efficiency measures along with return on assets to investigate the influence of ownership type. With respect to the impact of ownership, we conclude that privatization by itself is not sufficient to increase bank efficiency as government-owned banks are not appreciably less efficient than domestic private banks. We find that foreign-owned banks are more cost-efficient than other banks and that they also provide better service, in particular if they have a strategic foreign owner. The remaining government-owned banks are less efficient in providing services, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the better banks were privatized first in transition countries.

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Although the finance-growth relationship is now firmly entrenched in the empirical literature, we show that it is not as strong in more recent data as it was in the original studies with data for the period from 1960 to 1989. We consider two related explanations. First, excessive financial deepening or too rapid growth of credit may have led to both inflation and weakened banking systems which in turn gave rise to growthinhibiting financial crises. Second, excessive financial deepening may be a result of widespread financial liberalizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s in countries that lacked the legal or regulatory infrastructure to exploit financial development successfully.We find that the increased incidence of financial crises since the 1990s is primarily responsible for the recent weakening of the finance-growth link, but find no direct evidence that liberalizations played an important supporting role.

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There have been profound changes in both political and economic institutions in China over the last twenty years. Moreover, the pace of transition has led to variation across the country in the level of development. In this paper, we use panel data for the Chinese provinces to study the role of legal institutions, financial deepening and political pluralism on growth rates. The most important institutional developments for a transition economy are the emergence and legalization of the market economy, the establishment of secure property rights, the growth of a private sector, the development of financial sector institutions and markets, and the liberalization of political institutions. We develop measures of these phenomena, which are used as explanatory variables in regression models to explain provincial GDP growth rates. Our evidence suggests that the development of financial markets, legal environment, awareness of property rights and political pluralism are associated with stronger growth.2

Although the finance-growth relationship is now firmly entrenched in the empirical literature, we show that it is not as strong in more recent data as it was in the original studies with data for the period from 1960 to 1989. We consider two related explanations. First, excessive financial deepening or too rapid growth of credit may have led to both inflation and weakened banking systems which in turn gave rise to growthinhibiting financial crises. Second, excessive financial deepening may be a result of widespread financial liberalizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s in countries that lacked the legal or regulatory infrastructure to exploit financial development successfully.We find that the increased incidence of financial crises since the 1990s is primarily responsible for the recent weakening of the finance-growth link, but find no direct evidence that liberalizations played an important supporting role.