No abstract

Psychological constructivist models of emotion propose that emotions arise from the combinations of multiple processes, many of which are not emotion specific. These models attempt to describe both the homogeneity of instances of an emotional “kind” (why are fears similar?) and the heterogeneity of instances (why are different fears quite different?). In this article, we review the iterative reprocessing model of affect, and suggest that emotions, at least in part, arise from the processing of dynamical unfolding representations of valence across time. Critical to this model is the hypothesis that affective trajectories—over time—provide important information that helps build emotional states.

Across four studies, we used mouse tracking to identify the dynamic, on-line cognitive processes that underlie successful self-control decisions. First, we showed that individuals display real-time conflict when choosing options consistent with their long-term goal over short-term temptations. Second, we found that individuals who are more successful at self-control-whether measured or manipulated-show significantly less real-time conflict in only self-control-relevant choices. Third, we demonstrated that successful individuals who choose a long-term goal over a short-term temptation display movements that are smooth rather than abrupt, which suggests dynamic rather than stage-based resolution of self-control conflicts. These findings have important implications for contemporary theories of self-control.

People's behaviors are often guided by valenced responses to objects in the environment. Beyond positive and negative evaluations, attitudes research has documented the importance of attitude strength--qualities of an attitude that enhance or attenuate its impact and durability. Although neuroscience research has extensively investigated valence, little work exists on other related variables like metacognitive judgments about one's attitudes. It remains unclear, then, whether the various indicators of attitude strength represent a single underlying neural process or whether they reflect independent processes. To examine this, we used functional MRI (fMRI) to identify the neural correlates of attitude strength. Specifically, we focus on ambivalence and certainty, which represent metacognitive judgments that people can make about their evaluations. Although often correlated, prior neuroscience research suggests that these 2 attributes may have distinct neural underpinnings. We investigate this by having participants make evaluative judgments of visually presented words while undergoing fMRI. After scanning, participants rated the degree of ambivalence and certainty they felt regarding their attitudes toward each word. We found that these 2 judgments corresponded to distinct brain regions' activity during the process of evaluation. Ambivalence corresponded to activation in anterior cingulate cortex, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex. Certainty, however, corresponded to activation in unique areas of the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex. These results support a model treating ambivalence and certainty as distinct, though related, attitude strength variables, and we discuss implications for both attitudes and neuroscience research.

The ability to mentally represent future events is a significant human psychological achievement. A challenge that people encounter is that they often lack detailed specifics about distant relative to near future events. Construal level theory proposes that people represent distant future events by their abstract and essential features—a process referred to as high-level construal. As events become temporally proximal, people represent events by their increasingly available and reliable concrete and idiosyncratic features—a process referred to as low-level construal. The present fMRI experiment provides direct neural evidence for these assertions. Using the why–how localizer as a measure of construal level, results revealed brain regions associated with both temporal distance and high-level construal (medial prefrontal cortex), as well as temporal proximity and low-level construal (precuneus). We discuss the implications of these findings for the neuroscience of mental time travel and cognitive representation.