ABSTRACT:Basing its arguments in current perspectives on the nature of the scientific enterprise, which see argument and argumentative practice as a core activity of scientists, this article develops the case for the inclusion and central role of argument in science education. Beginning with a review of the nature of argument, it discusses the function and purpose of dialogic argument in the social construction of scientific knowledge and the interpretation of empirical data. The case is then advanced that any education about science, rather than education in science, must give the role of argument a high priority if it is to give a fair account of the social practice of science, and develop a knowledge and understanding of the evaluative criteria used to establish scientific theories. Such knowledge is essential to enhance the public understanding of science and improve scientific literacy. The existing literature, and work that has attempted to use argument within science education, is reviewed to show that classroom practice does provide the opportunity to develop young people's ability to construct argument. Furthermore, the case is advanced that the lack of opportunities for the practice of argument within science classrooms, and lack of teacher's pedagogical skills in organizing argumentative discourse within the classroom are significant impediments to progress in the field. We should not assume that mere contact with science, which is so critical, will make the students think critically. (Rogers, 1948, p. 7) Correspondence to: J. Osborne; e-mail: jonathan.osborne@kcl.ac.uk *Deceased DRIVER, NEWTON, AND OSBORNE OVERVIEWThis study presents the rationale for a research program in the area of argument in science -an area to which science education has only given scant attention. As argument is a central feature of the resolution of scientific controversies (Fuller, 1997; Taylor, 1996), it is somewhat surprising that science teaching has paid so little attention to a practice that lies at the heart of science. It is our contention that this significant omission has led to important shortcomings in the education that is provided about science. It has given a false impression of science as the unproblematic collation of facts about the world, hence making controversies between scientists, whether historical or contemporary, puzzling events (Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996;Geddis, 1991). Such a disregard for the practice of argument has also failed to empower students with the ability to critically examine the scientific claims generated by the plethora of socioscientific issues that confront them in their everyday lives (Norris & Phillips, 1994;Solomon, 1991).Science in schools is commonly portrayed from a "positivist perspective" as a subject in which there are clear "right answers" and where data lead uncontroversially to agreed conclusions. This is a view perhaps most aptly expressed by Schwab who argued that science is "taught as a nearly unmitigated rhetoric of conclusions in which the current and t...

Basing its arguments in current perspectives on the nature of the scientific enterprise, which see argument and argumentative practice as a core activity of scientists, this article develops the case for the inclusion and central role of argument in science education. Beginning with a review of the nature of argument, it discusses the function and purpose of dialogic argument in the social construction of scientific knowledge and the interpretation of empirical data. The case is then advanced that any education about science, rather than education in science, must give the role of argument a high priority if it is to give a fair account of the social practice of science, and develop a knowledge and understanding of the evaluative criteria used to establish scientific theories. Such knowledge is essential to enhance the public understanding of science and improve scientific literacy. The existing literature, and work that has attempted to use argument within science education, is reviewed to show that classroom practice does provide the opportunity to develop young people's ability to construct argument. Furthermore, the case is advanced that the lack of opportunities for the practice of argument within science classrooms, and lack of teacher's pedagogical skills in organizing argumentative discourse within the classroom are significant impediments to progress in the field.

Current theory and experimental research suggests that children's discovery of false beliefs at around 4 years of age allows the development of intentional deception. Anecdotal evidence of earlier lies has been dismissed with the argument that they may be 'blind' learned strategies rather than genuine deception. This paper presents two studies of everyday deception in comparison with false-belief task performance in young children. Study 1, a longitudinal study of 24 children, shows that the variety and incidence of everyday deceptions reported by mothers did not relate to success or failure on a battery of false-belief tasks, either between different children or over time in the same children. In Study 2 the deceptions of a 2½-year-old child over a 6-month period were shown to be varied, flexible, context appropriate and too complex to be 'blind' learned strategies. It is argued that children's deceptive skills develop from pragmatic need and situational exigencies rather than from conceptual developments; they may learn to lie in the same way as they learn to speak.

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Standards for talking and thinking about validity have been promulgated in North America for decades. In 1954 two foundational standards were announced: (a) Thou shalt not refer to "the validity of the test" and (b) thou shalt use validity modifier labels, such as "content validity" or "predictive validity." Subsequently, in 1985, the latter became, thou shalt not use validity modifier labels. These standards for talking about validity have repeatedly been disregarded over the years. Possible reasons include intentional misuse, while upholding standards for thinking about validity; lack of awareness or misunderstanding of standards for thinking about validity; and genuine divergence from standards for thinking about validity. A historical analysis of disregard for these standards provides a basis for reappraising the concept of validity. We amassed a new body of evidence with which to challenge the frequently asserted claim that a general consensus exists over the meaning of validity. Indeed, the historical analysis provides reason to believe that prospects for achieving consensus over the meaning of validity are low. We recommend that the concept of validity be abandoned in favor of the more general, all-encompassing concept of quality, to be judged in relation to measurement aims, decision making aims, and broader policy aims, respectively.

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