Targeted advertising has been subject to many privacy complaints from both users and policy makers. Despite this attention, users still have little understanding of what data the advertising platforms have about them and why they are shown particular ads. To address such concerns, Facebook recently introduced two transparency mechanisms: a "Why am I seeing this?" button that provides users with an explanation of why they were shown a particular ad (ad explanations), and an Ad Preferences Page that provides users with a list of attributes Facebook has inferred about them and how (data explanations).

Sites like Facebook and Google now serve as de facto data brokers, aggregating data on users for the purpose of implementing powerful advertising platforms. Historically, these services allowed advertisers to select which users see their ads via targeting attributes. Recently, most advertising platforms have begun allowing advertisers to target users directly by uploading the personal information of the users who they wish to advertise to (e.g., their names, email addresses, phone numbers, etc.); these services are often known as custom audiences. Custom audiences effectively represent powerful linking mechanisms, allowing advertisers to leverage any PII (e.g., from customer data, public records, etc.) to target users. In this paper, we focus on Facebook's custom audience implementation and demonstrate attacks that allow an adversary to exploit the interface to infer users' PII as well as to infer their activity. Specifically, we show how the adversary can infer users' full phone numbers knowing just their email address, determine whether a particular user visited a website, and de-anonymize all the visitors to a website by inferring their phone numbers en masse. These attacks can be conducted without any interaction with the victim(s), cannot be detected by the victim(s), and do not require the adversary to spend money or actually place an ad. We propose a simple and effective fix to the attacks based on reworking the way Facebook de-duplicates uploaded information. Facebook's security team acknowledged the vulnerability and has put into place a fix that is a variant of the fix we propose. Overall, our results indicate that advertising platforms need to carefully consider the privacy implications of their interfaces.

Matching the profiles of a user across multiple online social networks brings opportunities for new services and applications as well as new insights on user online behavior, yet it raises serious privacy concerns. Prior literature has proposed methods to match profiles and showed that it is possible to do it accurately, but using evaluations that focused on sampled datasets only. In this paper, we study the extent to which we can reliably match profiles in practice, across real-world social networks, by exploiting public attributes, i.e., information users publicly provide about themselves. Today's social networks have hundreds of millions of users, which brings completely new challenges as a reliable matching scheme must identify the correct matching profile out of the millions of possible profiles. We first define a set of properties for profile attributesAvailability, Consistency, non-Impersonability, and Discriminability (ACID)-that are both necessary and sufficient to determine the reliability of a matching scheme. Using these properties, we propose a method to evaluate the accuracy of matching schemes in real practical cases. Our results show that the accuracy in practice is significantly lower than the one reported in prior literature. When considering entire social networks, there is a non-negligible number of profiles that belong to different users but have similar attributes, which leads to many false matches. Our paper sheds light on the limits of matching profiles in the real world and illustrates the correct methodology to evaluate matching schemes in realistic scenarios.

After the seminal work by Taqqu et al. relating selfsimilarity to heavy-tailed distributions, a number of research articles verified that aggregated Internet traffic time series show selfsimilarity and that Internet attributes, like Web file sizes and flow lengths, were heavy-tailed. However, the validation of the theoretical prediction relating self-similarity and heavy tails remains unsatisfactorily addressed, being investigated using either numerical or network simulations, or from uncontrolled Web traffic data. Notably, this prediction has never been conclusively verified on real networks using controlled and stationary scenarios, prescribing specific heavy-tailed distributions, and estimating confidence intervals. With this goal in mind, we use the potential and facilities offered by the large-scale, deeply reconfigurable and fully controllable experimental Grid5000 instrument, combined with state-ofthe-art estimators, to investigate the prediction's observability on real networks. To this end, we organize a large number of controlled traffic circulation sessions on a nationwide real network involving 200 independent hosts. We use a FPGA-based measurement system to collect the corresponding traffic at packet level. We then estimate both the self-similarity exponent of the aggregated time series and the heavy-tail index of flow-size distributions, independently. Not only do our results complement and validate, with a striking accuracy, some conclusions drawn from a series of pioneering studies, but they also bring in new insights on the controversial role of certain components of real networks.

The Facebook advertising platform has been subject to a number of controversies in the past years regarding privacy violations, lack of transparency, as well as its capacity to be used by dishonest actors for discrimination or propaganda. In this study, we aim to provide a better understanding of the Facebook advertising ecosystem, focusing on how it is being used by advertisers. We first analyze the set of advertisers and then investigate how those advertisers are targeting users and customizing ads via the platform. Our analysis is based on the data we collected from over 600 real-world users via a browser extension that collects the ads our users receive when they browse their Facebook timeline, as well as the explanations for why users received these ads. Our results reveal that users are targeted by a wide range of advertisers (e.g., from popular to niche advertisers); that a nonnegligible fraction of advertisers are part of potentially sensitive categories such as news and politics, health or religion; that a significant number of advertisers employ targeting strategies that could be either invasive or opaque; and that many advertisers use a variety of targeting parameters and ad texts. Overall, our work emphasizes the need for better mechanisms to audit ads and advertisers in social media and provides an overview of the platform usage that can help move towards such mechanisms.

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Linear regression amounts to estimating a linear model that maps features (e.g., age or gender) to corresponding data (e.g., the answer to a survey or the outcome of a medical exam). It is a ubiquitous tool in experimental sciences. We study a setting in which features are public but the data is private information. While the estimation of the linear model may be useful to participating individuals, (if, e.g., it leads to the discovery of a treatment to a disease), individuals may be reluctant to disclose their data due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we propose a generic game-theoretic model to express this trade-off. Users add noise to their data before releasing it. In particular, they choose the variance of this noise to minimize a cost comprising two components: (a) a privacy cost, representing the loss of privacy incurred by the release; and (b) an estimation cost, representing the inaccuracy in the linear model estimate. We study the Nash equilibria of this game, establishing the existence of a unique non-trivial equilibrium. We determine its efficiency for several classes of privacy and estimation costs, using the concept of the price of stability. Finally, we prove that, for a specific estimation cost, the generalized least-square estimator is optimal among all linear unbiased estimators in our non-cooperative setting: this result extends the famous Aitken/Gauss-Markov theorem in statistics, establishing that its conclusion persists even in the presence of strategic individuals.

Attack detection is usually approached as a classification problem. However, standard classification tools often perform poorly because an adaptive attacker can shape his attacks in response to the algorithm. This has led to the recent interest in developing methods for adversarial classification, but to the best of our knowledge, there have been very few prior studies that take into account the attacker's tradeoff between adapting to the classifier being used against him with his desire to maintain the efficacy of his attack. Including this effect is key to derive solutions that perform well in practice.In this investigation we model the interaction as a game between a defender who chooses a classifier to distinguish between attacks and normal behavior based on a set of observed features and an attacker who chooses his attack features (class 1 data). Normal behavior (class 0 data) is random and exogenous. The attacker's objective balances the benefit from attacks and the cost of being detected while the defender's objective balances the benefit of a correct attack detection and the cost of false alarm. We provide an efficient algorithm to compute all Nash equilibria and a compact characterization of the possible forms of a Nash equilibrium that reveals intuitive messages on how to perform classification in the presence of an attacker. We also explore qualitatively and quantitatively the impact of the non-attacker and underlying parameters on the equilibrium strategies.