The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was intended to create jobs and boost the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. However, constituency support was difficult to garnish, and negotiations were frozen in late 2016, leaving their conclusion in doubt. What led to this stage? Why has an agreement been elusive? Using an array of indicators this paper argues that a major reason was the extensive and professionally structured public mobilization campaign conducted by European civil society organizations (CSOs). This shifted public opinion across Europe, which in turn impacted policy. Our research contributes to the literatures on trade, lobbying, and transatlantic relations, with relevance beyond TTIP. The paper discusses how generalized and diffused interests and public opinion are impacting an area of public policy (trade) traditionally influenced predominantly by lobbying from narrowly focused interests.

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This paper looks at the TTIP from a trade policy perspective. It argues that while TTIP is an unprecedented bilateral agreement, it does not constitute a Polanyian moment. TTIP is unprecedented in both EU and international trade policy terms because it offers an alternative to WTO multilateralism. Never before has bilateralism offered such a 'best alternative to no agreement' (BATNA) to members of the core decision-making body of the WTO negotiating arm, making TTIP an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer. The anti-TTIP campaign, however, has not been driven either by geopolitical or trade liberalization concerns but by fears about EU bargaining power. By strategically focusing on the potential impact on public policy and safety standards, normative arguments promulgated by opponents to TTIP reflect concerns with perceived threats to the EU status quo, and a willingness to preserve the same. The US is presented (implicitly) as more powerful than the EU, and therefore perceived as able to impose its preferences which are considered too neo-liberal.