Three studies tested basic assumptions derived from a theoretical model based on the dissociation of automatic and controlled processes involved in prejudice. Study 1 supported the model's assumption that high-and low-prejudice persons are equally knowledgeable of the cultural stereotype. The model suggests that the stereotype is automatically activated in the presence of a member (or some symbolic equivalent) of the stereotyped group and that low-prejudice responses require controlled inhibition of the automatically activated stereotype. Study 2, which examined the effects of automatic stereotype activation on the evaluation of ambiguous stereotype-relevant behaviors performed by a race-unspecified person, suggested that when subjects' ability to consciously monitor stereotype activation is precluded, both high-and low-prejudice subjects produce stereotype-congruent evaluations of ambiguous behaviors. Study 3 examined high-and low-prejudice subjects' responses in a consciously directed thought-listing task. Consistent with the model, only low-prejudice subjects inhibited the automatically activated stereotype-congruent thoughts and replaced them with thoughts reflecting equality and negations of the stereotype. The relation between stereotypes and prejudice and implications for prejudice reduction are discussed. Social psychologists have long been interested in stereotypes and prejudice, concepts that are typically viewed as being very much interrelated. For example, those who subscribe to the tripartite model of attitudes hold that a stereotype is the cognitive component of prejudiced attitudes (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 1969;Secord&Backman, 1974). Other theorists suggest that stereotypes are functional for the individual, allowing rationalization of his or her prejudice against a group

Empirical evidence is presented from 7 samples regarding the factor structure; reliability; and convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity of separate measures of internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. The scales reliably measure largely independent constructs and have good convergent and discriminant validity. Examination of the qualitatively distinct affective reactions to violations of own-and other-based standards as a function of the source of motivation to respond without prejudice provides evidence for the predictive validity of the scales. The final study demonstrated that reported stereotype endorsement varies as a function of motivation and whether reports are made in private or publicly Results are discussed in terms of their support for the internal-external distinction and the significance of this distinction for identifying factors that may either promote or thwart prejudice reduction.

Most empirical research investigating the motivational properties of cognitive dissonance has focused on the arousal component of dissonance rather than on the psychological component explicitly delineated by L. Festinger (1957). In 2 induced-compliance experiments, a self-report measure of affect was used to demonstrate that dissonance is experienced as psychological discomfort and that this psychological discomfort is alleviated on implementation of a dissonance-reduction strategy, attitude change. Experiment 1 yielded supporting evidence for both of these propositions. Experiment 2 replicated the 1st experiment and ruled out a self-perception-based alternative explanation for the dissonance-reduction findings in Experiment 1. Results from the 2 experiments strongly support Festinger's conceptualization of cognitive dissonance as a fundamentally motivational state.

We developed a multi-faceted prejudice habit-breaking intervention to produce long-term reductions in implicit race bias. The intervention is based on the premise that implicit bias is like a habit that can be reduced through a combination of awareness of implicit bias, concern about the effects of that bias, and the application of strategies to reduce bias. In a 12-week longitudinal study, people who received the intervention showed dramatic reductions in implicit race bias. People who were concerned about discrimination or who reported using the strategies showed the greatest reductions. The intervention also led to increases in concern about discrimination and personal awareness of bias over the duration of the study. People in the control group showed none of the above effects. Our results raise the hope of reducing persistent and unintentional forms of discrimination that arise from implicit bias.

Three studies examined the moderating role of motivations to respond without prejudice (e.g., internal and external) in expressions of explicit and implicit race bias. In all studies, participants reported their explicit attitudes toward Blacks. Implicit measures consisted of a sequential priming task (Study 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Studies 2 and 3). Study 3 used a cognitive busyness manipulation to preclude effects of controlled processing on implicit responses. In each study, explicit race bias was moderated by internal motivation to respond without prejudice, whereas implicit race bias was moderated by the interaction of internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. Specifically, high internal, low external participants exhibited lower levels of implicit race bias than did all other participants. Implications for the development of effective self-regulation of race bias are discussed.

In this article, the authors identify three methodological short-comings of the classic Princeton trilogy studies: (a) ambiguity of the instructions given to respondents, (b) no assessment of respondents' level of prejudice, and (c) use of an outdated list of adjectives. These shortcomings are addressed in the authors' assessment of the stereotype and personal beliefs of a sample of University of Wisconsin students. In contrast to the commonly espoused fading stereotype proposition, data suggest that there exists a consistent and negative contemporary stereotype of Blacks. Comparing the data from the Princeton trilogy studies with those of the present study, the authors conclude that the Princeton trilogy studies actually measured respondents' personal beliefs, not (as typically assumed) their knowledge of the Black stereotype. Consistent with Devine's model, high- and low-prejudiced individuals did not differ in their knowledge of the stereotype of Blacks but diverged sharply in their endorsement of the stereotype.

Ss reported their standards for how they should respond and how they would respond in contact situations with Black people (Study 1) and homosexual men (Study 2). Interest centered on the affective consequences associated with should-would discrepancies. Low and moderately prejudiced Ss with discrepancies reacted with feelings of global discomfort and with more specific feelings of compunction (guilt and self-criticism). High prejudiced Ss with discrepancies experienced only global discomfort. Study 3 data indicated that low prejudiced Ss internalized their nonprejudiced standards and felt obligated to respond consistently with them. High prejudiced Ss' personal standards were less well internalized and appeared to be derived from their perceptions of society's standards, which Ss indicated were mixed (i.e., contained both egalitarian and discriminatory components). Implications for prejudice reduction and contemporary models of prejudice are discussed.Many Southerners have confessed to me, for instance, that even though in their minds they no longer feel prejudice toward Blacks, they still feel squeamish when they shake hands with a Black. These feelings are left over from what they learned in their families as children. (Pettigrew, 1987, p. 20) Defeated intellectually, prejudice lingers emotionally. (Allport, 1954, p. 328) Pettigrew's and AUport's observations suggest that conscious decisions to renounce prejudice do not immediately eliminate prejudiced responses. Overcoming a lifetime of socialization experiences that, unfortunately, promote prejudice (Devine, 1989; Dovidio & Gaertner, in press;Ehrlich, 1973;P. A. Katz, 1976) is an arduous task. Thus, efforts to defeat prejudice are likely to involve a great deal of internal conflict between consciously endorsed nonprejudiced beliefs and lingering stereotypic thoughts and feelings.The coexistence of these contradictory reactions (i.e., nonprejudiced beliefs and negative responses) has often been regarded with suspicion in the prejudice literature. Of central concern is that many people who report nonprejudiced attitudes on surveys also manifest prejudice on nonconsciously monitored measures (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980;Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Several theorists have resolved the conflict by assuming that verbal reports are not trustworthy indicators of These studies were supported in part by a grant from the University of Wisconsin Graduate School. We gratefully acknowledge Valerie

Drawing on previous theorizing from both the prejudice and social anxiety literatures, a model of the antecedents and implications of intergroup anxiety is offered. It is argued that a lack of positive previous experiences with outgroup members creates negative expectancies about interracial interactions, which result in intergroup anxiety. This anxiety is posited to result in heightened hostility toward outgroup members and a desire to avoid interacting with outgroup members. Study 1 examined White participants' responses to interacting with Black people using a range of self-report measures; the associations between these responses supported the relationships outlined in the model. Study 2 explored White participants' responses to an anticipated interaction with a Black person or a White person. The findings revealed that high levels of anxiety about an interaction with a Black person, but not a White person, were associated with a lower likelihood of returning for the interaction.