Criminal profiling is used in complex investigations, and, in a number of jurisdictions, as expert evidence in criminal trials. This article seeks to move beyond the many anecdotal accounts of success by profilers and examine the evidence available as to the discipline's validity. As it stands, profiling is based on theories that are uncertain at best, and little research has been undertaken to assess the actual accuracy of generated profiles. This absence of validation is in part due to genuine difficulties associated with designing appropriate testing models. It is exacerbated by the reluctance of profilers to engage in such a process, relying instead on the well-rehearsed, yet somewhat circular argument that the continuing demand for profiling advice is in itself reassuring evidence of the method's validity. It is the lack of objective evidence of validity in this area that will be critically considered in this article.

The defence of mental incapacity raises unique challenges in the particular context of mass atrocity and international criminal law. Yet, it has remained largely unexplored in the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. The Trial Chamber judgment issued by the International Criminal Court in the case of Dominic Ongwen offered a unique opportunity to remedy this and clarify the legal contours of the defence. Unfortunately, the court engaged minimally with these issues. This article examines the court’s reasoning in the Ongwen case and the lessons that may be learnt from it about the operation of the defence, particularly in relation to the treatment of expert evidence. It is contended that while there were significant shortcomings in the claim put forward by Ongwen in the aftermath of the judgment, the prospects of advancing a successful defence of mental incapacity based on control-related disorders in the future appear limited.

This article focuses on three specific legal developments arising from the Martinović and Naletilić Judgement of the ICTY. The first issue is the possibility of prisoners of war consenting to perform otherwise prohibited labour under Geneva Convention III. The second relates to the legal definition of occupation within the meaning of Geneva Convention IV. The third issue concerns the trial chamber's analysis of the discriminatory requirement as an element of the offence of persecution.

No abstract

No abstract