This study examines whether the market values financial statement data differently if it is disclosed instead of recognized in the body of the financial statements. We identify a sample of 229 SFAS No. 106 adopters who disclose an estimate of their anticipated liability for retiree benefits other than pensions (PRB) in their financial reports prior to the year of recognition. We then test whether the disclosed estimate of the PRB liability is valued differently by the market than is the subsequently recognized PRB liability. We provide modest and model-sensitive evidence that the recognized PRB liability receives more weight than the disclosed liability in market value association tests.

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This paper examines a fundamental question of interest to researchers and regulators: Does the market treat disclosed financial statement information as if it is less reliable than information recognized in the body of the financial statements? Specifically, we compare the perceived reliability of liabilities for retiree benefits other than pensions (PRBs) disclosed prior to adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106 (SFAS No. 106) with the perceived reliability of PRB liabilities subsequently recognized under SFAS No. 106. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the market treating disclosed PRB liabilities as less reliable than recognized PRB liabilities and pension liabilities. However, once PRB liabilities are recognized, they do not appear to be any less reliable than pension liabilities. These findings are inconsistent with the Choi, Collins, and Johnson 1997 conclusion that PRB liabilities are inherently less reliable than pension liabilities. The paper also investigates factors that may have contributed to the lower perceived disclosure reliability. Our results suggest that the market perceived PRB liability disclosures to be less reliable when firms provided range disclosures, had higher probabilities of reducing plan benefits, or had lower ratios of retiree to total PRB obligations. These findings suggest that reliability may have been enhanced if more supporting details had been provided in Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 74 disclosures.

Abstract:We examine whether US firms' M&A decisions influence the likelihood of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts and whether clawback adoption improves subsequent M&A decisions. Because prior research finds that poor M&A decisions are associated with future earnings restatements, we predict that clawback adoption is more likely after these transactions. We further conjecture that M&A decisions will improve after clawback adoption, as its presence reduces executives' willingness to manipulate post-acquisition earnings. Consistent with our expectations, we find that (1) firms with more negative M&A announcement returns are more likely to adopt clawbacks; (2) firms that acquire targets with relatively poor accounting quality are more likely to adopt clawbacks; (3) clawbacks improve investor perception of M&A quality; and (4) executives are more responsive to the market when completing M&A deals if their compensation contracts include clawbacks. These results suggest that boards take a pro-active approach and consider factors that may lead to restatements when adopting clawbacks. Our results have implications for US policymakers, as the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires mandatory adoption of clawbacks. Our results also suggest that non-US firms can reduce managerial incentives to manipulate post-takeover earnings by using clawbacks.

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