This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link Cross-Industry Product Diversification and Contagion in Risk and Return:The Case of Bank-Insurance and Insurance-Bank Takeovers ABSTRACTWe investigate the impact of domestic/international bancassurance deals on the risk-return profiles of announcing and non-announcing banks and insurers within a GARCH model. Bankinsurance deals produce intra-and inter-industry contagion in both risk and return, with larger deals producing greater contagion. Bidder banks and peers experience positive abnormal returns, with the effects on insurer peers being stronger than those on bank peers. Insurance-bank deals produce insignificant excess returns for bidder and peer insurers and positive valuations for peer banks. Following the deal, the bank bidders' idiosyncratic (systematic) risk falls (increases), while insurance bidders exhibit a lower systematic risk and maintain their idiosyncratic risk.

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This paper explores a wide range of corporate restructurings, all available deals from wire services, in the banking and insurance sectors that led to bancassurance ventures. An event study methodology is employed to calculate excess returns on and around the deals’ announcement date. Using both univariate and multivariate analysis the paper finds bank driven mergers, deal's size and regional categorization all triggering positive and significant market reactions. Unlike the univariate framework, multivariate analysis shows that geographic focus and language are not significant factors. The results also indicate that markets are indifferent with respect to bank withdrawals from the bank‐insurance operations. Finally, Canadian, U.S. and European bank‐insurance deals produce positive results, while Australasian bidders offer statistically insignificant equity returns.

We contribute to the current regulatory debate by examining the wealth and risk effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on U.S. financial institutions. We measure the effects of key legislative events of the Act by means of a multivariate regression model using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework. Our results indicate a mixed reaction by financial institutions during the various stages of the Act's legislative process. Further tests reveal that any positive reactions are driven by small and/or low risk institutions, while negative ones are consistent across subsets; except for investment banks. We also find market risk increases for most financial institutions that are dominated by small and/or low risk institutions. The cross-section results reveal that large institutions fare better than their smaller counterparts and that large investment banks gain value at the expense of others. Overall, the Dodd-Frank Act may have redistributed value among financial institutions, while not necessarily reducing the industry's riskiness.