This article discusses how an illiberal regime within the EU can hinder the mobilization of citizens and civil actors by creating an atmosphere of "ambiguity". In our analysis, we first discuss the Constitution of 2011, which provides the driving force of the regime, and next using the example of the migration crisis show how this atmosphere of ambiguity is created. We argue that although there is no physical violence present, opponents of the regime are disheartened to act because of the general atmosphere relying on the logic of constitutional othering, dividing the world into its enemies and friends and shifting from the rule of law to ruling by law. While the regime's gaudy campaigns against immigrants, NGOs, Central European University, the EU or George Soros are omnipresent, we aim to go deeper and highlight the mechanism through which the regime manages to discourage citizens from voicing their discontent.

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In the last decade, there has been a tendency for governments to impose tighter restrictions on civil society organizations, especially those promoting democracy and human rights. In this study, we examine how human rights organizations are responding to the increasingly hostile political environment in Hungary. The expanding limits on civil society organizations is usually discussed within a framework labelled as the closing space for civil society, which emphasizes the legislation and governmental actions directly attacking civil society organizations. Despite the impression that the restrictions threaten the existence of these organizations, a closer examination reveals that well-established organizations are capable of developing coping strategies to survive. To fully understand how these strategies are developed, we need to supplement this framework with the theory of political opportunity structures. This broader theoretical perspective examines the openness of decision-making processes for non-ruling actors and includes the role of perceptions in the examination of reactions to changes in the opportunity structure. As our study shows, perceptions about the social environment have a crucial role in understanding the strategies of human rights organizations. Examining the reactions of ten organizations, primarily using the method of organizational interviews, we show that rather than direct restrictions attacking civil society organizations, the major factor shaping their strategies is the closing of political opportunities. As a consequence of an almost total closure of decision-making mechanisms, they have been changing their activities from focusing on their roles as experts and working with state institutions to emphasizing social embeddedness, community building and raising awareness.

A tanulmány célja egyfelől a politikai attitűdök vizsgálatakor a Részvétel, képviselet, pártosság (NKFI119603) kutatás adatain keresztül a demokráciára vonatkozó asszociációk elemzése, a fogalom hazai értelmezése mögötti összefüggések vizsgálata, valamint a politikai meggyőződésből, a gazdasági teljesítmény értékeléséből, illetve a demográfiai különbségekből adódó eltérések feltárása. Másfelől, bemutatjuk a demokráciával való elégedettség, és a pártos polarizáció időbeli változását Európában, felhasználva az European Social Survey (ESS) adatait. Eredményeink, a pártos polarizációs elméleteknek megfelelően igazolják, hogy a demokráciával való elégedettség politikai preferencia függvénye is: a kormánypárti szavazók jóval elégedettebbek a demokráciával, mint az ellenzékiek. Ez a különbség a vizsgált európai országok körében Magyarországon kiemelkedően nagy, ráadásul az elmúlt években folyamatosan növekszik is. Azonban nemcsak a demokráciával való elégedettség esetén, hanem a demokrácia értelmezése vonatkozásában is érvényesül a pártosság. A kormánypárti szavazók más szavakkal, szókapcsolatokkal írták le a demokráciát, mint a 2018 nyarán erősen kiábrándultnak tűnő ellenzéki szavazók.

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This paper focuses on Hungary’s illiberal regimes from the perspective of the opposition – a perspective we believe has been under-scrutinized so far. It argues that in order to understand the regime’s success it is crucial to explain why opposition parties have been unable to offer a credible alternative. The paper argues that the opposition is in a trap with three unfavourable factors mutually strengthening each other and undermining its ability for success. They are (1) the cartel party system; (2) the weak social embeddedness of opposition parties; and (3) lack of their presence in local politics. At the same time, we also point out that the rise of a tiny joke-party’s success (The Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party) highlights that these obstacles can be overcome even with very limited resources. Nevertheless, it is still unclear if the Dog Party’s innovative approach to doing politics could be ‘institutionalized’ – i.e. if it offers a feasible model strategy for opposition parties – or it is only an efficient way of mocking and criticizing how the political system operates.

In the last few decades, political dissatisfaction has not been in the focus of studies explaining participation in collective political action. Hechter, Pfaff, and Underwood (2016) stressed that "literature has thrown the baby out with the bath water," when studies disregarded political dissatisfaction and overemphasized other factors like organizational resources and framing processes. Following Linde and Ekman's (2003) argumentation, we differentiate between evaluations about system principles and system performance as sources of political dissatisfaction. We refine the concept of dissatisfaction based on the theories by Kriesi (Kriesi 2013, Bühlmann-Kriesi 2013, Ferrín-Kriesi 2016) using the European comparative dataset (European Social Survey, Round 6). Moreover we elucidate the mechanism linking different types of dissatisfaction to protest activity. The aim of this article is to clarify the concept of political dissatisfaction and to show its relevance as a driver of participation in collective action. We also answer the questions: "What forms of political dissatisfaction drive citizens to participate in collective action?" and "Does dissatisfaction with implemented principles like political and personal rights have any additional impact on participation, compared to more tangible regime performance?"

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