Gradient insulator-based dielectrophoresis used to generate separation and concentration of Staphylococcus epidermidis, gentamicin-resistant and susceptible strains.

Relations between interior self-knowledge and (a) imaginary companion (IC) status and (b) theory of mind (ToM) abilities were investigated in a sample (N= 80) of 4- to 7-year-olds. Interior self-knowledge was assessed in terms of the extent to which children acknowledged that they (rather than an adult) were the authority on unobservable aspects of themselves (e.g., dreaming, thinking, hunger). Compared with children without an IC, those who possessed a parentally corroborated IC ascribed less interior self-knowledge to an adult, with a trend for them to assign more interior self-knowledge to themselves. Children's interior self-knowledge judgments were not associated with their ToM performance. IC status was also unrelated to ToM performance. We consider how having an IC may provide children with opportunities to distinguish between knowledge that is inaccessible to an external observer and that which an external observer may glean without being told.

Relations between having an imaginary companion (IC) and (i) descriptions of a real-life friend, (ii) theory of mind performance, and (iii) reported prosocial behaviour and behavioural difficulties were investigated in a sample of 5-year-olds (N = 159). Children who had an IC were more likely than their peers without an IC to describe their best friends with reference to their mental characteristics, but IC status was unrelated to children's theory of mind performance and reported prosocial behaviour and behavioural difficulties. These findings are discussed in the context of the proposal that there is a competence–performance gap in children's mentalizing abilities. © 2014 The Authors. Infant and Child Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Relations between children's imaginary companion status and their engagement in private speech during free play were investigated in a socially diverse sample of 5-year-olds (N=148). Controlling for socioeconomic status, receptive verbal ability, total number of utterances, and duration of observation, there was a main effect of imaginary companion status on type of private speech. Children who had imaginary companions were more likely to engage in covert private speech compared with their peers who did not have imaginary companions. These results suggest that the private speech of children with imaginary companions is more internalized than that of their peers who do not have imaginary companions and that social engagement with imaginary beings may fulfill a similar role to social engagement with real-life partners in the developmental progression of private speech.

One of the deficits observed in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is impaired imaginative play. One form of imaginative play common in many typically developing (TD) children is having an imaginary companion (IC). The occurrence of ICs has not been investigated extensively in children with ASD. We examined differences in parent report of IC between TD and ASD populations in 215 (111 with ASD) gender-matched children aged between 2 and 8 years. Findings indicate that significantly fewer children with ASD created ICs, although there were many between-group similarities in IC forms and functions. Results are discussed in terms of qualitative differences in play, social attributions, and how children with ASD conceptualize their ICs’ minds.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (10.1007/s10803-018-3540-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Highlights Childhood imaginary friend report predicted adult prodromal hallucination symptoms. Childhood imaginary friend report did not predict other adult prodromal symptoms. Childhood adversity report predicted all types of adult prodromal symptoms. Childhood adversity mediated imaginary friend prodromal hallucination symptoms.

Past research shows that autistic children can and do create imaginary companions (ICs), and that these ICs resemble those that neurotypical children create. Neurotypical children creating ICs have been found to have significantly more developed theory of mind (ToM) and social understanding among other enhanced social cognitive skills. The study set out to determine if this finding applies to autistic children. Parents of 124 (38 female) autistic children, ages from 5 to –12 years old, completed questionnaires evaluating communication, social understanding, and social skills. Children with ICs had significantly higher ToM and social skills scores regardless of their communication abilities. Findings suggest that there is a variability in ToM and social skills in autistic children in reference to an IC play profile. Results are discussed in terms of direction of causality and lab-based investigations. Lay abstract Research on neurotypical children with imaginary friends has found that those with imaginary friends have better social skills and are more able to think about how other people’s minds work compared to children without imaginary friends. Research shows that some autistic children also create imaginary friends. This article is the first to look at whether or not autistic children with imaginary friends have stronger social skills and an improved ability to think about others’ minds than those without imaginary friends. We asked parents to report about their children aged 5 to 12. Finding almost half reported their child had an imaginary friend, a much larger number than previous research with younger children. Our findings also suggested that autistic children with imaginary friends were better able to understand others’ minds and had stronger social skills than their peers without imaginary friends. The children’s language ability did not influence this. The findings of this study add to the evidence that with respect to the creation imaginary friends and their potential benefits, the play profiles of autistic children are similar to the general population. It also provides more evidence that the understanding of others’ minds is not all or nothing in autism and gives reason for researchers to investigate whether the causes of these differences are the same or different for autistic children.