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BackgroundAmyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) is a devastating neurological condition that requires coordinated, multidisciplinary clinical management. ALS is prone to misdiagnosis as its signs and symptoms may be non-specific, which may prolong patients’ journey to multidisciplinary ALS care.MethodsUsing chart review and national register data, we have detailed the journey of a national cohort of ALS patients (n = 155) from the time of first symptom to presentation at a multidisciplinary clinic (MDC). Key milestones were analysed, including frequency of consultations, clinical interventions, and associated economic cost.ResultsA majority of patients was male (60%), 65 years of age and over (54%), and had spinal onset ALS (72%). Time from onset of first symptoms to ALS diagnosis was a mean of 15.1 months (median, 11). There was a mean interval of 17.4 months (median 12.5) from first symptoms to arrival at the MDC, and a mean of 4.09 (median, 4) consultations with health care professionals. Electromyography and nerve conduction studies were among the most common interventions. Direct referral by a general practitioner (GP) to a neurologist was associated with reduced cost, but not reduced diagnostic delay. Bulbar ALS was associated with shorter time from symptom onset to diagnosis. Neurologist consultation in the first three consultations was associated with lower costs prior to the ALS clinic attendance but not a shorter time from first symptom to final diagnosis. Mean cost prior to attending the MDC was €3,486 per patient.ConclusionsExpedited referral to the multidisciplinary ALS clinic would have reduced costs by an estimated €2,072 per patient. Development of a standardised pathway with early referral to neurology of patients with suspected symptoms of ALS could limit unnecessary interventions and reduce cost of care.

Most doctors have never had their communication skills formally assessed and do not know how they compare with their peers. Glyn Elwyn and colleagues explain how AI might facilitate this and help improve interactions with patients

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BackgroundA persistent feature of international health policy debate is whether a single-payer or multiple-payer system can offer superior performance. In Ireland, a major reform proposal is the introduction of ‘managed competition’ based on the recent reforms in the Netherlands, which would replace many functions of Ireland’s public payer with a system of competing health insurers from 2016. This article debates whether Ireland meets the preconditions for effective managed competition, and whether the government should implement the reform according to its stated timeline. We support our arguments by discussing the functioning of the Dutch and Irish systems.DiscussionAlthough Ireland currently lacks key preconditions for effective implementation, the Dutch experience demonstrates that some of these can be implemented over time, such as a more rigorous risk equalization system. A fundamental problem may be Ireland’s sparse hospital distribution. This may increase the market power of hospitals and weaken insurers’ ability to exclude inefficient or poor quality hospitals from contracts, leading to unwarranted spending growth. To mitigate this, the government proposes to introduce a system of price caps for hospital services.The Dutch system of competition is still in transition and it is premature to judge its success. The new system may have catalyzed increased transparency regarding clinical performance, but outcome measurement remains crude. A multi-payer environment creates some disincentives for quality improvement, one of which is free-riding by insurers on their rivals’ quality investments. If a Dutch insurer invests in improving hospital quality, hospitals will probably offer equivalent quality to consumers enrolled with other insurance companies. This enhances equity, but may weaken incentives for improvement. Consequently the Irish government, rather than insurers, may need to assume responsibility for investing in clinical quality. Plans are in place to assure consumers of free choice of insurer, but a key concern is a potential shortfall of institutional capacity to regulate managed competition.SummaryManaged competition requires a long transition period and the requisite preconditions are not yet in place. The Irish government should refrain from introducing managed competition until sufficient preconditions are in place to allow effective performance.

In order to ensure the continued, safe administration of pharmaceuticals, particularly those agents that have been recently introduced into the market, there is a need for improved surveillance after product release. This is particularly so because drugs are used by a variety of patients whose particular characteristics may not have been fully captured in the original market approval studies. Even well-conducted, randomized controlled trials are likely to have excluded a large proportion of individuals because of any number of issues. The digitization of medical care, which yields rich and accessible drug data amenable to analytic techniques, provides an opportunity to capture the required information via observational studies. We propose the development of an open, accessible database containing properly de-identified data, to provide the substrate for the required improvement in pharmacovigilance. A range of stakeholders could use this to identify delayed and low-frequency adverse events. Moreover, its power as a research tool could extend to the detection of complex interactions, potential novel uses, and subtle subpopulation effects. This far-reaching potential is demonstrated by our experience with the open Multi-parameter Intelligent Monitoring in Intensive Care (MIMIC) intensive care unit database. The new database could also inform the development of objective, robust clinical practice guidelines. Careful systematization and deliberate standardization of a fully digitized pharmacovigilance process is likely to save both time and resources for healthcare in general. Limitations of Clinical TrialsIn the quest for the safe and effective use of pharmaceuticals, there is a pressing need for improved surveillance to reduce the risk of preventable morbidity and mortality after products are released. Clearly, such pharmacovigilance represents a form of care optimization as postrelease safety cannot be maximally assured even by excellent premarket studies. This is particularly so because these agents are prescribed to patient populations that are often not completely represented in the original studies required for market approval. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs), the gold standard for defining drug efficacy and safety profiles, are often of inadequate duration, are too narrow in indication and scope, and consist of relatively few test subjects.1 Therefore, RCTs are ill-equipped to fully unravel heterogeneity of treatment

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An important determinant of health system performance is contracting. Providers often respond to financial incentives, despite the ethical underpinnings of medicine, and payers can craft contracts to influence performance. Yet contracting is highly imperfect in both single-payer and multi-payer health systems. Arguably, in a competitive, multi-payer environment, contractual innovation may occur more rapidly than in a single-payer system. This innovation in contract design could enhance performance. However, contractual innovation often fails to improve performance as payer incentives are misaligned with public policy objectives. Numerous countries seek to improve healthcare contracts, but thus far no health system has demonstrably crafted the necessary blend of incentives to stimulate optimal contracting. Keywords: Healthcare, Competition, Contracts, Innovation, Performance Copyright: © 2016 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences Citation: Mikkers M, Ryan P. Optimisation of healthcare contracts: tensions between standardisation and innovation Comment on: "Competition in healthcare: good, bad or ugly.