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Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is a clinical syndrome in animals due to FMD virus that exists in seven serotypes, whereby recovery from one sero-type does not confer immunity against the other six. So when considering intervention strategies in endemic settings, it is important to take account of the characteristics of the different serotypes in different ecological systems. FMD serotypes are not uniformly distributed in the regions of the world where the disease still occurs. For example, the cumulative incidence of FMD serotypes show that six of the seven serotypes of FMD (O, A, C, SAT-1, SAT-2, SAT-3) have occurred in Africa, while Asia contends with four sero-types (O, A, C, Asia-1), and South America with only three (O, A, C). Periodically there have been incursions of Types SAT-1 and SAT-2 from Africa into the Middle East. This paper describes the global dynamics for the seven sero-types and attempts to define FMD epidemiological clusters in the different regions of the world. These have been described on a continent by continent basis. The review has reaffirmed that the movement of infected animals is the most important factor in the spread of FMD within the endemically infected regions. It also shows that the eco-system based approach for defining the epidemiological patterns of FMD in endemic, which was originally described in South America, can apply readily to other parts of the world. It is proposed that any coordinated regional or global strategy for FMD control should be based on a sound epidemiological assessment of the incidence and distribution of FMD, identifying risk sources as either primary or secondary endemic eco-systems.

Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by H5N1 viruses were reported almost simultaneously in eight neighbouring Asian countries between December 2003 and January 2004, with a ninth reporting in August 2004, suggesting that the viruses had spread recently and rapidly. However, they had been detected widely in the region in domestic waterfowl and terrestrial poultry for several years before this, and the absence of widespread disease in the region before 2003, apart from localised outbreaks in the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region (SAR), is perplexing. Possible explanations include limited virus excretion by domestic waterfowl infected with H5N1, the confusion of avian influenza with other serious endemic diseases, the unsanctioned use of vaccines, and the under-reporting of disease as a result of limited surveillance. There is some evidence that the excretion of the viruses by domestic ducks had increased by early 2004, and there is circumstantial evidence that they can be transmitted by wild birds. The migratory birds from which viruses have been isolated were usually sick or dead, suggesting that they would have had limited potential for carrying the viruses over long distances unless subclinical infections were prevalent. However, there is strong circumstantial evidence that wild birds can become infected from domestic poultry and potentially can exchange viruses when they share the same environment. Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that wild birds have played a more significant role in spreading disease than trade through live bird markets and movement of domestic waterfowl. Asian H5N1 viruses were first detected in domestic geese in southern China in 1996. By 2000, their host range had extended to domestic ducks, which played a key role in the genesis of the 2003/04 outbreaks. The epidemic was not due to the introduction and spread of a single virus but was caused by multiple viruses which were genotypically linked to the Goose/GD/96 lineage via the haemagglutinin gene. The H5N1 viruses isolated from China, including the Hong Kong SAR, between 1999 and 2004 had a range of genotypes and considerable variability within genotypes. The rising incidence and widespread reporting of disease in 2003/04 can probably be attributed to the increasing spread of the viruses from existing reservoirs of infection in domestic waterfowl and live bird markets leading to greater environmental contamination. When countries in the region started to report disease in December 2003, others were alerted to the risk and disease surveillance and reporting improved. The H5N1 viruses have reportedly been eliminated from three of the nine countries that reported disease in 2003/04, but they could be extremely difficult to eradicate from the remaining countries, owing to the existence of populations and, possibly, production and marketing sectors, in which apparently normal birds harbour the viruses.

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