The almost nineteen years of international troops’ presence and their support and donations to strengthen a democratic state in Afghanistan were in vain. The state-building process began with the toppling of a retrogressive regime, which was considered the base of al-Qaeda leaders who masterminded the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Within 20 years, the Afghan government could not use the opportunities made available by the international community and the US presence in the country. Although most criticisms are leveled at the United States for this state-building failure, on the contrary, its roots in Afghanistan can be precisely traced back to the central government. In other words, the state-building failure in Afghanistan has inner flaws. The blame is not attributable to its international allies regarding the fragility of the state and decay of democracy. This article illustrates how state-building at the pivotal centre of democracy failed in Afghanistan. The main hurdles of state-building are also scrutinised.
Afghanistan is a multinational country with a weak nationalism. The fragility of nationalism and nations often has been due to races, religion, and stereotypes; however, in Afghanistan, the centralization of power has created fragility and significant rifts among ethnicities which the outcome is sub-nationalism. Sub-nationalism could be harmless in a decentralized political system, however, not definitely in a centralized political system. Throughout history, the centrality of authority strengthened ethnic cleavages, rivalries of ethnics overpower, single-ethnic hegemony, weak governance, and significantly disrupted the unity of ethnics. The big hurdle of Afghanistan for being a nation-state has been the centralization of power. Most authors and pamphlets advise concentration of power versus decentralized system in the country to preserve the unity of ethnicities. At the same time, Afghanistan experienced that such a system did not trigger unity of the nationalities.
This paper elucidates the two ideologies that fundamentally lead to the failure of the regimes and often weakened the state: tribalism and religious fundamentalism. Both its social bed is the same and have a key role in returning of the Taliban after 2001. Except for the external supportive factors of the Taliban, the internal factors, the tribalism and fundamentalism and fund hegemonic resources such as Mullahs (clergies) and Madrasas are extremely rooted in the society and in the government that functioned actively to expand the Taliban ideology in the country since the formation of the modern state in Afghanistan ( 1880). This study also illustrates the return of the Taliban after 20 years of efforts for state-building in the country which proved still that fundamentalism and tribalism consider the main challenge versus state and nation-building in Afghanistan.
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