Background: Nearly every nation in the world faces shortages of health workers in remote areas. Cameroon is no exception to this. The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) is currently considering several rural retention strategies to motivate qualified health personnel to practice in remote rural areas. Methods: To better calibrate these mechanisms and to develop evidence-based retention strategies that are attractive and motivating to health workers, a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) was conducted to examine what job attributes are most attractive and important to health workers when considering postings in remote areas. The study was carried out between July and August 2012 among 351 medical students, nursing students and health workers in Cameroon. Mixed logit models were used to analyze the data. Results: Among medical and nursing students a rural retention bonus of 75% of base salary (aOR= 8.27, 95% CI: 5.28-12.96, P< 0.001) and improved health facility infrastructure (aOR= 3.54, 95% CI: 2.73-4.58) respectively were the attributes with the largest effect sizes. Among medical doctors and nurse aides, a rural retention bonus of 75% of base salary was the attribute with the largest effect size (medical doctors aOR= 5.60, 95% CI: 4.12-7.61, P< 0.001; nurse aides aOR= 4.29, 95% CI: 3.11-5.93, P< 0.001). On the other hand, improved health facility infrastructure (aOR= 3.56, 95% CI: 2.75-4.60, P< 0.001), was the attribute with the largest effect size among the state registered nurses surveyed. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) estimates were generated for each health worker cadre for all the attributes. Preference impact measurements were also estimated to identify combination of incentives that health workers would find most attractive. Conclusion: Based on these findings, the study recommends the introduction of a system of substantial monetary bonuses for rural service along with ensuring adequate and functional equipment and uninterrupted supplies. By focusing on the analysis of locally relevant, actionable incentives, generated through the involvement of policymakers at the design stage, this study provides an example of research directly linked to policy action to address a vitally important issue in global health. Implications for policy makers• Based on a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) analyzed using mixed logit and Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) analysis, we recommend substantial monetary bonuses for rural service along with ensuring supplies and equipment for at least a basic package of health services to motivate health workers • Classification of posts based on remoteness and tying level of bonuses to this may be necessary to attract health workers to the most rural areas • Offering specialist training and housing, as proposed by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) were less popular incentives across health worker cadres examined • Focusing on actionable incentives and conducting locally relevant research are vital if findings are to influence policy-making Implications for publicAttracting and retaining qu...

Performance-based financing (PBF) is a mechanism by which health providers are paid on the basis of outputs or results delivered. A PBF program was implemented on the provision of HIV, prevention of mother-to child HIV transmission (PMTCT), and maternal/child health (MCH) services in two provinces of Mozambique. A retrospective case–control study design was used in which PBF provinces were matched with control provinces to evaluate the impact of PBF on 18 indicators. Due to regional heterogeneity, we evaluated the intervention sites (North and South) separately. Beginning January 2011, 11 quarters (33 months or 2.75 years) of data from 134 facilities after matching (84 in the North and 50 in the South) were used. Our econometric framework employed a multi-period, multi-group difference-in-differences model on data that was matched using propensity scoring. The regression design employed a generalized linear mixed model with both fixed and random effects, fitted using the seemingly unrelated regression technique. PBF resulted in positive impacts on MCH, PMTCT and paediatric HIV program outcomes. The majority of the 18 indicators responded to PBF (77% in the North and 66% in the South), with at least half of the indicators demonstrating a statistically significant increase in average output of more than 50% relative to baseline. Excluding pregnant women, the majority of adult HIV treatment indicators did not respond to PBF. On average, it took 18 months (six quarters) of implementation for PBF to take effect, and impact was generally sustained thereafter. Indicators were not sensitive to price, but were inversely correlated to the level of effort associated with marginal output. No negative impacts on incentivized indicators nor spill-over effects on non-incentivized indicators were observed. The PBF program in Mozambique has produced large, sustained increases in the provision of PMTCT, paediatric HIV and MCH services. Our results demonstrate that PBF is an effective strategy for driving down the HIV epidemic and advancing MCH care service delivery as compared with input financing alone.