Controversies over the return of large carnivores (e.g. wolves) are often interpreted as clashes between rural traditionalism and urban modernity. Rural communities, however, have never been culturally monolithic, and modernization increases their diversity. However, the popular image is one of rural communities united against vermin and urban romantics. An important reason for this is probably the successful construction of the anti‐carnivore front as a last line of defence against destructive forces threatening rural life. Drawing on examples from a study in Østerdalen, Norway, the struggle against wolf protection is discussed as an instance of symbolic construction of community. Images of a threatened community are vital to the self‐understanding of the wolf adversaries, but cleavages run through the alliance. Three principal groups may be identified: sheep farmers, landowners who lease hunting, and people with strong ties to traditional land use practices (primarily hunting) and a rural working‐class culture. These groups have not always been allies, and conflicts of interest run through the ‘resistance front’. The task here is to identify the social forces that now bring them together, and to explain why the carnivore issue is well suited as a significant component in their symbolic construction of community.

Due to strict protection through the last decades, wolves have returned to many areas from which they have been absent for a long time. This is a conservation success story, but the wolves also cause conflicts wherever they arrive. We have studied the situation in southeastern Norway and in the French Alps, where the conflict patterns are similar. Diverging interpretations of the situation are supported by narratives, and two varieties have become increasingly significant in both countries. Rumors about the secret reintroduction of wolves are common among wolf adversaries. Another narrative, important to the pro‐wolf camp, is based on the notion that particular sheep husbandry practices (unattended rough grazing) are unique to either Norway or France—whereas there are in fact more similarities than differences. Yet, while the reintroduction‐conspiracy rumors are ridiculed, the notion of unique national conflict patterns has achieved a status almost of official truth. Furthermore, the story about natural wolf recovery is itself a value‐laden narrative, and not only “scientific fact.” The different status of these narratives tell us something about power relations: Given their different social basis, it seems relevant to consider the national uniqueness image and the natural recovery theory as tightly interwoven with symbolic power and the reintroduction conspiracy rumors as similarly interwoven with patterns of cultural resistance.

In their article "Cool dudes: The denial of climate change among conservative white males in the United States" (McCright and Dunlap 2011a) the authors state: "Clearly the extent to which the conservative white male effect on climate change denial exists outside the US is a topic deserving investigation." Following this recommendation, we report results from a study in Norway. McCright and Dunlap argue that climate change denial can be understood as an expression of protecting group identity and justifying a societal system that provides desired benefits. Our findings resemble those in the US study. 63 percent of conservative males in Norway do not believe in anthropogenic climate change, as opposed to 36 percent among the rest of the population who deny climate change and global warming. Expanding on the US study, we investigate whether conservative males more often hold what we term xenoskeptic views, and if that adds to the 'cool dude-effect'. 1 Multivariate logistic regression models reveal strong effects from a variable measuring 'xenoskeptic cool dudes'. Interpreting xenoskepticism as a rough proxy for right leaning views, climate change denial in Norway seems to merge with broader patterns of right-wing nationalism.

Hunting is an activity that appears to provoke -often immediate and strongly pronouncedmoral assessments, i.e., judgments of what is 'right' or 'wrong'. A large body of literature explores these moral arguments, often from a philosophical or normative perspective, focusing on specific types of hunting. However, studies that ground such explorations in empirical, systematically analysed, yet contextualised data seem to be missing. We argue that 2 such an approach is essential to understand conflicts over hunting and wildlife management, and present data from focus group discussions and interviews with hunters, non-hunters and hunting critics across six countries in Europe and eastern Africa.Our findings suggest that moral arguments play an extremely important role in the legitimation and delegitimation of hunting practices through discourse. In particular, study participants referred to the motives of hunters as a factor that, in their eyes, determined the acceptability of hunting practices. Moral argumentations exhibited patterns that were common across study sites, such as a perceived moral superiority of the 'moderate' and 'measured', and a lack of legitimacy of the 'excessive'. Implicit orders of hunting motives were used to legitimise types of hunting that were suspected to be contested.On the basis of these findings, we discuss how the moral elements of hunting discourses relate to broader discourses on environmental management, and how these are used to establish (or dispute) the legitimacy of hunting . Our analysis also suggests that there might be more overlap between moral arguments of hunters, non-hunters and hunting critics than popularly assumed, which, where required, could be used as a starting point for conflict management.

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