Résumé Cet article porte sur la transmission des entreprises familiales, et en particulier sur un des facteurs déterminants de succès, à savoir le choix du dirigeant-repreneur, interne à la famille ou externe. Au vu de l’absence d’un consensus empirique dans ce domaine, nous proposons un cadre d’analyse théorique fondé sur l’approche cognitive de la gouvernance qui correspond bien au contexte des entreprises familiales, celles-ci concentrant de nombreuses ressources spécifiques (capital social, valeurs inhérentes à la famille, etc.). A la lumière de cette approche, il semblerait qu’il y ait lieu de privilégier un successeur interne, dont l’immersion au sein de l’entreprise et de la famille lui procure des avantages qui lui permettent d’identifier les ressources cognitives de l’entreprise et d’en déduire les opportunités stratégiques adéquates, selon un processus de prise de décision collégial, garant de la résolution des conflits cognitifs sous-jacents. Cette hypothèse est ensuite testée auprès d’un échantillon de PME familiales belges ayant fait l’objet d’une transmission. La méthodologie du pairage statistique, qui compare les performances de PME familiales transmises à un repreneur interne à celles d’homologues transmises à un repreneur externe, semble confirmer les avantages d’un successeur interne.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a difference can be stated in the family firms' financial choices. Using the Shyam-Sunder and Myers model, our research focus on the financial behaviour of family and non-family privately held firms in Belgium. Out of a sample of 210 privately held firms for the period 2002-2010, panel data methodology is employed to estimate Pecking-Order and Static Trade-off models. Our results show that although neither Pecking Order nor Static Trade-off Theory seems to apply to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to adopt an indebtedness target ratio. Moreover, the introduction of an allowance for corporate equity on the Belgian market is also taken into account. Our results indicate that such a mechanism seems to have an influence on the family firms funding choices.Keywords: family firm, debt, financial structure, capital structure, financial behavior, allowance for corporate equity IntroductionIn the literature relative to the financial structure of the firm, two theories are regularly confronted. The theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958) revealed the neutrality of the financial structure under the hypothesis of a perfect market. By introducing corporate income tax, Modigliani and Miller (1963) demonstrated the superiority of firms using debts, since the take advantage of the deductibility of interest expenses. Nevertheless, this model was criticized because it did not take into account the costs of distress within the firm. In order to fill this gap, Static Trade-off Theory was built to develop a model based on a costs-profits analysis resulting from the issuance of debt (Krauss & Litzenberger, 1973). This theory assumes the existence of a target indebtedness ratio equalling the profits of the deductibility of interest expenses and the costs of distress of the firm. Besides, an alternative theory was proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984): the Pecking-Order Theory. Under this theory, due to information asymmetry between managers and external investors, self-financing would be preferred to debts and stocks issuance by the managers.
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