This paper discusses some challenges for the design of sympathetic robots, including a lack of conceptual clarity and the difficulty of quantifying an instance of sympathy. Candace Clark’s sociological sympathy account is offered as a solid theoretical basis for advancing the design and acceptance of sympathetic robots. The aspects of her theory relevant to HRI and some potential challenges in its implementation are discussed, as well as the alarming potential for sympathetic robots to act ideologically imperialistic, or to ‘nudge’ users across cultural boundaries.
This paper discusses the ethical nature of empathetic and sympathetic engagement with social robots, ultimately arguing that an entity which is engaged with through empathy or sympathy is engaged with as an “experiencing Other” and is as such due at least “minimal” moral consideration. Additionally, it is argued that extant HRI research often fails to recognize the complexity of empathy and sympathy, such that the two concepts are frequently treated as synonymous. The arguments for these claims occur in two steps. First, it is argued that there are at least three understandings of empathy, such that particular care is needed when researching “empathy” in human-robot interactions. The phenomenological approach to empathy—perhaps the least utilized of the three discussed understandings—is the approach with the most direct implications for moral standing. Furthermore, because “empathy” and “sympathy” are often conflated, a novel account of sympathy which makes clear the difference between the two concepts is presented, and the importance for these distinctions is argued for. In the second step, the phenomenological insights presented before regarding the nature of empathy are applied to the problem of robot moral standing to argue that empathetic and sympathetic engagement with an entity constitute an ethical engagement with it. The paper concludes by offering several potential research questions that result from the phenomenological analysis of empathy in human-robot interactions.
This paper discusses organizational and HRI research on the topic of creativity in order to draw attention to some underexplored ethical dimensions of both fields. Through an examination of the relationship between emotional labor, the affect-creativity link, and social robots aimed at augmenting human creative outputs or skills, we argue that researchers working with creativity ought to engage in ethical reflection on how their research results might impact practice ab initio—rather than forgoing such reflection or doing so only after the fact. Furthermore, we suggest that creativity researchers working with social robots or the affect-creativity link not only have a normative responsibility to engage with the potential ethical implications of the applications of their research results, but that by doing so from the start they will be positioned to exert some influence over how these results might be employed.
Anthropomorphism represents a central theoretical term in social robotics and human robot interaction (HRI) research. However, the research into anthropomorphism displays several conceptual problems that translate into methodological shortcomings. Here we report the results of a scoping review, which we conducted in order to explore (i) how the notion of ‘anthropomorphism’ is understood in HRI and social robotics research, and (ii) which assessment tools are used to assess anthropomorphism. Three electronic databases were searched; two independent reviewers were involved in the screening and data extraction process; a total of 57 studies were included in the final review which encompassed 43 different robots and 2947 participants. Across studies, researchers used seven different definitions of anthropomorphism and most commonly assessed the phenomenon by use of amended versions of existing questionnaires (n = 26 studies). Alternatively, idiosyncratic questionnaires were developed (n = 17 studies) which, as a qualitative thematic analysis of the individual questionnaire items revealed, addressed nine distinct themes (such as attribution of shared intentionality, attribution of personality etc.). We discuss these results relative to common standards of methodological maturity and arrive at the conclusion that the scope and heterogeneity of definitions and assessment tools of anthropomorphism in HRI hinders cross-study comparisons, while the lack of validated assessment tools might also affect the quality of results. To nurture reflection on these methodological challenges and increase comparability within the field we conclude by offering a set of reporting guidelines for research on anthropomorphism, as a first constructive effort to facilitate a coherent theory of anthropomorphism.
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