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For many years various types of devices equipped with sensors have guaranteed proper work in a huge amount of machines and systems. For the proper operation of sensors, devices, and complex systems, we need secure communication. Security protocols (SP) in this case, guarantee the achievement of security goals. However, the design of SP is not an easy process. Sometimes SP cannot realise their security goals because of errors in their constructions and need to be investigated and verified in the case of their correctness. Now SP uses often time primitives due to the necessity of security dependence on the passing of time. In this work, we propose and investigate the SAT-and SMT-based formal verification methods of SP used in communication between devices equipped with sensors. For this, we use a formal model based on networks of communicating timed automata. Using this, we show how the security property of SP dedicated to the sensors world can be verified. In our work, we investigate such timed properties as delays in the network and lifetimes. The delay in the network is the lower time constraint related to sending the message. Lifetime is an upper constraint related to the validity of the timestamps generated for the transmitted messages.

Part 7: Various Aspects of Computer SecurityInternational audienceThis paper presents a detailed analysis of the mutual authentication protocol developed especially for the system MobInfoSec - for a mobile device to share and protect classified information. MobInfoSec uses fine-grained access rules described by general access structures. In this paper we describe the architecture and functioning of the system, and the requirements imposed on cryptographic authentication protocols, resulting from both: standards, the collection of good practices, as well as directly from the vision of the system. The article contains a description of the protocol’s parts and formal analysis of its security

Abstract. The article discusses the issues of modeling and the analysis of executions, which is a substantial part of modern communication protocols -authentication protocols, which are generally referred to herein as security protocols. The article presents a way of security protocols executions analysis with the use of probabilistic automata, without well known and widely used perfect cryptography assumption (we assume allowing the possibility of breaking a key with a specified probability). This type of analysis leads to interesting observations about the operation of the protocol and its weaknesses.

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