In this paper we use data from the Afrobarometer surveys to demonstrate that there is an undesirable spill-over from petty corruption in the public sector to trust in private sector institutions. Our results show that experiencing bribery in the course of one's interactions with the public sector lowers one's trust in big private corporations, small businesses, and local traders. This finding holds even when we allow for perceptions of political corruption to enter the specification. We do not find any significant association between a measure of interpersonal trust and bribery experience which suggests that our findings with regards to market institutions are not driven by corruption lowering trust in general. Having to pay a bribe for household services, which is perhaps the setting most like a private sector transaction, is the corrupt interaction most strongly associated with the decline in private sector trust. We find some evidence that the spill-over is larger in democracies than in non-democratic regimes. Given the importance of trust in market institutions for the efficient functioning of an economy, our findings thus point to a previously unknown and potentially substantial cost of corruption and add to the case for anti-corruption efforts.JEL Classification: D73, K4, O10, O55
The aim of this paper is to investigate the link between ownership type of the bank and its corporate governance and to find an empirical background for the hypothesis about relationships between corporate governance effectiveness and bank’s performance. The article also covers some theoretical backgrounds concerning regulation in banking sphere. The results of the study reveal that there is direct relationship between ownership type and corporate governance, while, on the contrary, there is no link between corporate governance and bank performance. Study findings provide the math-based recommendations to the national regulator about capital requirements.
This paper was aimed to examine the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance in terms of ownership of 41 banks that represent Ukrainian banking system in 2006-2009. Correlation results could be used as an indicator of the weak link between corporate governance dynamics and operating performance. The Corporate Governance Dynamics Ratio was introduced to evaluate the CG in banks from the sample. It was determined during the study that majority of the banks could be found in the "30 to 80 points" range, which indicates the low level of CG practices' implementation. On the other hand, there were some outliers -6 banks with Ukrainian ownership have higher rankings then foreign-owned ones ("over 80 points" range), while 5 foreign banks are "outsiders" with CG Ratios in the range "less than 30". In general it can be stated that the level of corporate governance in Ukrainian banking is in the initial phase, internal and state regulation should be introduced in order international practices to be put into action.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.