Abstract-In technical support scams, cybercriminals attempt to convince users that their machines are infected with malware and are in need of their technical support. In this process, the victims are asked to provide scammers with remote access to their machines, who will then "diagnose the problem", before offering their support services which typically cost hundreds of dollars. Despite their conceptual simplicity, technical support scams are responsible for yearly losses of tens of millions of dollars from everyday users of the web.In this paper, we report on the first systematic study of technical support scams and the call centers hidden behind them. We identify malvertising as a major culprit for exposing users to technical support scams and use it to build an automated system capable of discovering, on a weekly basis, hundreds of phone numbers and domains operated by scammers. By allowing our system to run for more than 8 months we collect a large corpus of technical support scams and use it to provide insights on their prevalence, the abused infrastructure, the illicit profits, and the current evasion attempts of scammers. Finally, by setting up a controlled, IRB-approved, experiment where we interact with 60 different scammers, we experience first-hand their social engineering tactics, while collecting detailed statistics of the entire process. We explain how our findings can be used by law-enforcing agencies and propose technical and educational countermeasures for helping users avoid being victimized by technical support scams.
The popularity of Tor as an anonymity system has made it a popular target for a variety of attacks. We focus on traffic correlation attacks, which are no longer solely in the realm of academic research with recent revelations about the NSA and GCHQ actively working to implement them in practice.Our first contribution is an empirical study that allows us to gain a high fidelity snapshot of the threat of traffic correlation attacks in the wild. We find that up to 40% of all circuits created by Tor are vulnerable to attacks by traffic correlation from Autonomous System (AS)-level adversaries, 42% from colluding AS-level adversaries, and 85% from statelevel adversaries. In addition, we find that in some regions (notably, China and Iran) there exist many cases where over 95% of all possible circuits are vulnerable to correlation attacks, emphasizing the need for AS-aware relay-selection.To mitigate the threat of such attacks, we build Astoria-an AS-aware Tor client. Astoria leverages recent developments in network measurement to perform path-prediction and intelligent relay selection. Astoria reduces the number of vulnerable circuits to 2% against AS-level adversaries, under 5% against colluding AS-level adversaries, and 25% against state-level adversaries. In addition, Astoria load balances across the Tor network so as to not overload any set of relays.
The majority of commercial websites provide users the ability to contact them via dedicated contact pages. In these pages, users are typically requested to provide their names, email addresses, and reason for contacting the website. This effectively makes contact pages a gateway from being anonymous or pseudonymous, i.e., identified via stateful and stateless identifiers, to being eponymous. As such, the environment where users provide their personally identifiable information (PII) has to be trusted and free from intentional and unintentional information leaks. In this paper, we report on the first large-scale study of PII leakage via contact pages of the 100,000 most popular sites of the web. We develop a reliable methodology for identifying and interacting with contact forms as well as techniques that allow us to discover the leakage of PII towards thirdparties, even when that information is obfuscated. Using these methods, we witness the leakage of PII towards third-parties in a wide range of ways, including the leakage through third-party form submissions, third-party scripts that collect PII information from a first-party page, and unintended leakage through a browser’s Referer header. To recover the lost control of users over their PII, we design and develop Formlock, a browser extension that warns the user when contact forms are using PII-leaking practices, and provides the ability to comprehensively lock-down a form so that a user’s details cannot be, neither accidentally, nor intentionally, leaked to third parties
Given the ever-increasing number of malicious bots scouring the web, many websites are turning to specialized services that advertise their ability to detect bots and block them. In this paper, we investigate the design and implementation details of commercial anti-bot services in an effort to understand how they operate and whether they can effectively identify and block malicious bots in practice. We analyze the JavaScript code which their clients need to include in their websites and perform a set of gray box and black box analyses of their proprietary back-end logic, by simulating bots utilizing well-known automation tools and popular browsers. On the positive side, our results show that by relying on browser fingerprinting, more than 75% of protected websites in our dataset, successfully defend against attacks by basic bots built with Python scripts or PhantomJS. At the same time, by using less popular browsers in terms of automation (e.g., Safari on Mac and Chrome on Android) attackers can successfully bypass the protection of up to 82% of protected websites. Our findings show that the majority of protected websites are prone to bot attacks and the existing anti-bot solutions cannot substantially limit the ability of determined attackers. We have responsibly disclosed our findings with the anti-bot service providers.
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