This article assumes that social comparisons (a) constitute comparative judgments governed by the general process that applies to all judgments, (b) possess a common comparative structure including simple judgments of comparison stimuli and their juxtaposition, and (c) possess unique contents that determine the subjective meanings of comparison outcomes and their psychological implications. Examined in these terms, classical social comparison theory is found wanting in two respects: (a) It conveys a relatively fixed notion of social comparison in which people are generally driven to compare and do so mostly with respect to similar others and predominantly for the sake of evaluative accuracy. (b) Its narrow scope excludes numerous significant issues of interest to social comparison research today. It is proposed that the present, multilevel approach is useful for ordering past social comparison research and provides a heuristically rich paradigm for future work. Although interest in social comparison phenomena has waxed and waned over the years, Festinger's (1954a, 1954b) theory of social comparison processes has remained the most influential conceptual framework to guide this domain of study (Goethals, 1986). The theory of social comparison rests on the assumption that people Possess a drive to evaluate their opinions and abilities. This may take place by reference to physical reality (as in assessing one's ability to lift a weight by actual attempts to do so), or, where objective means of evaluation are unavailable, by comparison with other people. A major tenet of the theory has been that similar rather than dissimilar others provide the more desirable standard for comparison. Consequently, in order to precisely evaluate their opinions and abilities, persons were assumed to generally prefer comparisons with individuals who are similar to themselves. Over the years, Festinger's theory has undergone a number of revisions and extensions. In particular, new domains of comparison have been proposed (e.g, emotions, see Schachter, 1959; and values, see Goethals & Dadey, 1977). Similarly, additional motives relevant to comparison processes have been enumerated, such as the needs for self-enhancement (Gruder, 1971), validation (Goethals & Darley, 1977), maintenance of a positive self-evaluation (Tesser & Campbell, 1982), closure, and the avoidance of closure (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987). Furthermore, situations have been identified where dissimilar rather than similar others are preferred as targets of comparison