EBITDA is a commonly used performance measure for (i) valuation, (ii) debt contracting, and (iii) executive compensation. The widespread use of EBITDA by stakeholders may induce managers to focus their attention on EBITDA. Since EBITDA excludes various expenses, managers who fixate on EBITDA may underweight the excluded expenses when determining their firms' investments in capital and leverage levels. I find that managers who fixate on EBITDA overinvest in capital and overlever their firm relative to their industry peers. These results are robust to alternative proxies for managers' focus on EBITDA and alternative specifications. I also find that firms whose managers focus on EBITDA have weaker operating performance, which is attributed to higher depreciation expense. My primary proxy for managers' focus on EBITDA is whether they choose to disclose EBITDA in annual earnings announcements. I find that the use of EBITDA in setting executive compensation, the prevalence of EBITDA estimates by analysts, and the use of EBITDA-based covenants in firms' debt contracts are all positively associated with the propensity to disclose EBITDA in earnings announcements. I find weaker evidence of opportunistic motives explaining EBITDA disclosure. These results are consistent with managers disclosing EBITDA to portray to investors that it is a metric they seek to maximize. Overall, this study suggests that while EBITDA is a widely used metric, there is a systematic cost to using this measure-it provides managers with incentives to overinvest in capital and to acquire excessive debt.principale variable de substitution à la concentration des gestionnaires sur le BAIIA est le choix de publier ou non le BAIIA dans les annonces des résultats annuels. L'auteur note que l'utilisation du BAIIA dans la détermination de la rémunération des cadres, la prévalence des estimations du BAIIA proposées par les analystes et l'utilisation de clauses restrictives basées sur le BAIIA dans les contrats d'emprunt des sociétés affichent toutes un lien positif avec la propension à publier le BAIIA dans les annonces de résultats. Il relève des données moins probantes quant aux motivations opportunistes qui pourraient expliquer la publication du BAIIA. Ces résultats tendent à confirmer que les gestionnaires publieraient le BAIIA afin de signaler aux investisseurs leurs efforts pour maximiser cet indicateur. Dans l'ensemble, l'étude semble indiquer que, même si le BAIIA est un indicateur largement utilisé, son usage présente un coût systématique : il incite les gestionnaires à surinvestir dans les immobilisations et à abuser de l'emprunt.
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