Competition in day-ahead electricity markets has been established through auctions where generators and loads bid prices and quantities. Different approaches have been discussed regarding the market auction design. Multi-round auctions, despite its implementation complexity, allow market participants to adapt their successive bids to market prices considering their operational and economic constraints. However, most of the day-ahead electricity market implementations use noniterative single-round auctions. This paper presents a market simulator to compare both auction models. Different auction alternatives, such as the Spanish single-round auction that takes into account special conditions included in the generator bids, and multi-round auctions with different stopping rules, are analyzed. The results and acquired experience in the simulation of the Spanish market, started in January 1998, are presented. Hourly market prices, average daily price, price/demand correlation and several economic efficiency indicators, such as generator surplus, consumer surplus and social welfare, are compared to derive conclusions regarding the performance of the auction alternatives.
The new competitive framework that has been established in several electricity markets all over the world has changed the way that electric companies attain benefits. Under this new scenario, generation companies need to develop bidding models not only for the sake of achieving a feasible dispatch of their units, but also for maximizing their benefits. This paper presents a new bidding strategies model which considers the global policy of a company, but also specifies the bid of each generating unit. The proposed model produces a maximum price bid and an optimal bidding quantity by means of an iterative procedure using the generating company's residual demand curve. It is based on an economic principle known as the cobweb theorem, frequently used to study stability in trading markets. A realistic case study from the Spanish daily electric market is presented to illustrate the methodology.
The new competitive framework that has been established in several electricity markets all over the world has changed the way that electric companies attain benefits. Under this new scenario, generation companies need to develop bidding models not only for the sake of achieving a feasible dispatch of their units, but also for maximizing their benefits. This paper presents a new bidding strategies model which considers the global policy of a company, but also specifies the bid of each generating unit. The proposed model produces a maximum price bid and an optimal bidding quantity by means of an iterative procedure using the generating company's residual demand curve. It is based on an economic principle known as the cobweb theorem, frequently used to study stability in trading markets. A realistic case study from the Spanish daily electric market is presented to illustrate the methodology.
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