The key aim of current research is to investigate the influence of CG on financial performance (FP) and capital structure (CS) of cement companies listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). To accomplish this purpose, twenty cement firms listed on the PSX was deployed from 2005 to 2014. Auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity were tested and Regression analyses were used to test the hypotheses. SPSS 21 is conducted to perform the analyses.CG is analyzed via board size, board independence, and institutional ownership while, return on assets and return on equity are employed to analyze FP, whereas CS is calculated via debt to equity. The outcomes document that CG positively affects FP, however, negatively impact CS. This research not only contributes to examining the impact and association between CG, FP, and CS but also prove the outcomes of previous studies that have presented a significant influence and association between CG, FP, and CS.
This paper analyzes the effects of ownership concentration on investment performance in a large sample of Pakistani publicly-listed companies from 1997 to 2007. Special attention is directed to statistical methods from the field of panel-data econometrics, which are able to deal with endogeneity problems and with structural reverse causality. The preferred estimator that is based on firm fixed effects insinuates that the voting rights of ultimate shareholders affect Tobin's q unambiguously negatively, whereas the squared voting rights affect it unambiguously positively. This implies a U-curved relationship between Tobin's q and voting rights concentration with a turning point at 45%. More than 75% of the companies fall in the upward sloping part of the curve. While positive incentive effects are at work in Pakistan, financial market development is retarded by the reluctance of minority shareholders facing dominant shareholders to hold small stakes in listed companies. Consistently, institutional shareholders do not yet provide a positive monitoring role in Pakistan.JEL Classification Numbers: L2, G3, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12955/cbup.v4.764
This paper analyzes the effects of corporate governance institutions on investment returns of Pakistani listed companies. A marginal q is used to estimate returns on investments from cash flows, debt, and equity. Return on total investment is 31% lower than the cost of capital, which suggests that largest shareholders or managers invest beyond the optimal investment level that maximizes the wealth of shareholders. Return on reinvested cash flow is 30% lower than the cost of capital. There is evidence of our hypothesis that largest shareholders or managers exercise discretion while reinvesting cash flows. Return on investment financed from debt is lower than the cost of capital as financial institutions are faced with asymmetric information while analyzing creditworthiness of investments. The analysis provides evidence of market discipline on investments financed from debt by companies whose ultimate shareholders are foreign entities. Corporate governance institutions are unable to control managers of foreign-owned companies from issuing equity to finance investments with returns lower than the costs of capital. Financial market development is retarded because outside shareholders are reluctant to invest in equities and financial institutions are wary of financing borrowers. The weak corporate governance system is unable to properly protect financial institutions from loan delinquencies.JEL Classification: L2, G3
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