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We analyze the impact of an increase in the legal retirement age on the e¤ective retirement age in the Netherlands. We do this by means of a dynamic programming model for the retirement behavior of singles. The model is applied to new administrative data that contain very accurate and detailed information on individual incomes and occupational pension entitlements. Our model is able to capture the main patterns observed in the data. We observe that as individuals get older their labor supply declines considerably and this varies by health status. We simulate a soon to be implemented pension reform which aims at gradually increasing the legal retirement age from 65 to 67. The simulation results show a rather small impact on the e¤ective retirement age. Individuals postpone their retirement by only 3 months on average, while di¤erences across individuals mainly depend on their health status.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu While it is commonly believed that this has positive effects, to date, it is not well understood through which channels health insurance coverage contributes to the well-being of individuals. More generally, the effects are usually not quantified at the individual level. There are two main reasons for this. First, we lack detailed data on health care utilization and health outcomes, and second, it is not easy to control for selection into insurance. The second problem means that a regression of utilization or outcome measures on insurance coverage will yield biased results and will not estimate the causal effects of health insurance. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIn this paper, we make progress in both directions. We use rich survey data to evaluate the impact of access to the Peruvian Social Health Insurance called "Seguro Integral de Salud" for individuals outside the formal labor market on a variety of measures for health care utilization, preventive care, health expenditures, and health indicators. We address the second concern by exploiting a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. A household is eligible for the program if a welfare index that is calculated from a number of variables is below a specific threshold. We base our analysis on a natural experiment that is generated by variation in the index around the threshold. We interpret our results through the lens of a simple model. As expected, and in contrast to studies for a number of other countries, we find strong effects of insurance coverage on measures of health care utilization, such as visiting a doctor, receiving medication and medical analysis. The program does not strongly incentivice individuals or health care providers to invest into preventive care. In line with this, in general, we find no effects of insurance coverage on preventive care. The only exceptions to this are our findings that, controlling for selection into insurance coverage, women of fertile age with insurance are more likely to receive pregnancy care and that insured individuals are more likely to be vaccinated. This is in line with the stark decrease in maternal and child mortality that was observed after the program was introduced. As for health care expenditures, we generally find positive effects on the mean and the variability. We complement these findings with quantile treatment effect estimates that show increases at the high end of the distribution. Our inte...

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To shed light on the effects of individual choice on pension wealth, we study a policy change to the management fees of pension funds implemented by Peru's government in 2013. The reform established a new balance fee as a default option; this fee is calculated as a percentage of the pension balance. Each individual had the initial option of keeping the previous management fee, a load factor fee calculated as a percentage of the individual's salary. We use administrative data to simulate pension balances based on the individual's choice of fee and the corresponding counterfactual. Our results indicate that the reform has been potentially adverse to 63.1 percent of individuals, of whom 41.4 percent were assigned to the default option and 21.7 percent voluntarily chose the load fee. These results reflect both the potentially negative unintended effects of the policy and an alarming lack of financial literacy among citizens. We also detect heterogeneity in the intensity of the losses and gains due to the reform, which caused greater losses than gains. In particular, younger and poorer individuals, as well as those automatically assigned to the balance fee, experienced higher losses. Moreover, the new fee scheme is also associated with increasing inequality between individuals' pension wealth.

We analyze the impact of an increase in the legal retirement age on the e¤ective retirement age in the Netherlands. We do this by means of a dynamic programming model for the retirement behavior of singles. The model is applied to new administrative data that contain very accurate and detailed information on individual incomes and occupational pension entitlements. Our model is able to capture the main patterns observed in the data. We observe that as individuals get older their labor supply declines considerably and this varies by health status. We simulate a soon to be implemented pension reform which aims at gradually increasing the legal retirement age from 65 to 67. The simulation results show a rather small impact on the e¤ective retirement age. Individuals postpone their retirement by only 3 months on average, while di¤erences across individuals mainly depend on their health status.

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