In the last few years, questions pertaining to cooperation and conflict in the Arctic have emerged in the media, as well as within academia. While many scholars have rightly rejected the prospect of an imminent escalation of conflicts, the current debate is insufficiently informed by the literature on political order within the field of international relations (IR). In this article, the author attempts to explain the political order in the Arctic, situating his analysis within the broader context of IR theory. Guided by the perspectives of 'hegemonics stability', 'balance of power' and 'Kantian internationalist theory', focus is laid on power capabilities, international regimes and domestic regime type as independent variables. The main finding is that the Arctic is a multipolar 'region,' the enduring stability and peacefulness of which can be explained by both the role played by international regimes, and by the balance of power between the 'stakeholders' involved. The paper concludes by explaining how and why the smaller littoral Arctic states are the prime beneficiaries of this order.

This article investigates China's bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic towards the USA, Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and Iceland. In seeking to identify (1) the most important bilateral issues, (2) whether China's diplomacy towards some of Arctic states has been more successful than others, and (3) the long-term goals of China's Arctic diplomacy and presence, the article utilizes insights from theories of diplomacy in IR as well as the particular historical experiences of the PRC. It concludes with identifying how Beijing's utmost concern when it comes to foreign policy still centers on promoting economic benefits and creating a global presence conducive to economic growth. Yet, while economic factors undoubtedly preoccupy Chinese decision-making in the Arctic, Chinese representatives currently speak less about economic development than about their environmental concerns. Chinese footprints in the Arctic have been adequately established primarily in the scientific research field, while commerce and multilateral governance are secondary. Further, it is also apparent that China has been developing contracts with the smaller Arctic powers of Denmark and Iceland (and earlier also attempted to do so with Norway) to facilitate collaborations in both Arctic research as well as economic development. With the bigger Arctic powers, such as the USA and Russia, China appears to prioritize other, more pressing bilateral issues than those pertaining solely to the Arctic.

Puzzled by how geographical changes in the Arctic might cause changes in state behavior the authors of this article have been inspired to return to the roots of geopolitical reasoning. By combining insights from the intellectual roots of the geopolitical tradition with empirical data on geographical changes as well as policy changes in the Arctic today, we investigate the degree to which geopolitics, in the sense of geography influencing politics, is still a useful approach in the discipline of International Relations (IR). In limiting our primary focus to the state level, and investigating the period since the turn of the millennium, this article seeks to develop new knowledge concerning if, how, and to what extent geography matters in international politics. Our empirical investigation indicates that geographical changes in the Arctic have indeed had an effect on power relations among several states. Overall, this article shows that geography is an important factor in IR in the sense of enabling or empowering state actors. However, while it appears that physical geography is a possible factor in the cases analyzed to explain changes in identified power potentials, it does not always account for these changes on its own. Economic, political, legal, and historical factors also play a role in the observed power shifts.

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