Functional MRI neurofeedback (NF) allows humans to self-modulate neural patterns in specific brain areas. This technique is regarded as a promising tool to translate neuroscientific knowledge into brain-guided psychiatric interventions. However, its clinical implementation is restricted by unstandardized methodological practices, by clinical definitions that are poorly grounded in neurobiology, and by lack of a unifying framework that dictates experimental choices. Here we put forward a new framework, termed 'process-based NF', which endorses a process-oriented characterization of mental dysfunctions to form precise and effective psychiatric treatments. This framework relies on targeting specific dysfunctional mental processes by modifying their underlying neural mechanisms and on applying process-specific contextual feedback interfaces. Finally, process-based NF offers designs and a control condition that address the methodological shortcomings of current approaches, thus paving the way for a precise and personalized neuromodulation. The use of functional MRI (fMRI) in neurofeedback (fMRI-NF) has brought new hope to the field of self-guided neuromodulation. fMRI-NF allows individuals to modulate spatially localized neural patterns in real-time, using contingent rewarding feedback. Accumulating evidence suggests that in many cases, attaining significant neural modulations in line with the task protocol (i.e., NF success) is followed by corresponding mental and behavioural changes1, thus contributing to bridging the gap between brain functionality and our mental experience. Despite this promising prospect, the utilization of fMRI-NF for basic science as well as for clinical purposes has been slower than expected. This may be due to various methodological constraints, such as the lack of proper control conditions and inadequate blinding and randomization, as well as the relatively small sample sizes that characterize the field. Furthermore, brain-guided interventions do not correspond with current psychiatric categorization, which traditionally relies on subjective reports rather than on

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A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one’s own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics—the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness.