Reliable and objective data regarding building stock is essential for predicting and analyzing energy demand and carbon emission. However, China's building stock data is lacking. This study proposes a set of China building floor space estimation method (CBFSM) based on the improved building stock turnover model. Then it measures China's building stocks by vintage and type from 2000 to 2015, as well as building energy intensity (national level and provincial level) and energy-efficient buildings. Results showed that total building stocks increased significantly, rising from 35.2 billion m 2 in 2000 to 63.6 billion m 2 in 2015, with the average growth rate 4.0%. The deviations were well below 10% by comparing with China Population Census, which validated the reliability of CBFSM and the results. As for energy intensity, urban dwellings and rural dwellings showed relatively stable and increasing trend respectively. The commercial building energy intensity saw a downward trend during "12th Five Year Plan" period. This indicated the effectiveness of building energy efficiency work for commercial buildings since 2005.38.6 billion m 2 residential dwellings and 5.7 billion m 2 commercial buildings still need to be retrofitted in future. CBFSM can overcome shortages in previous studies. It can also provide Chinese government with technical support and data evidence to promote the building energy efficiency work.

Recent advances in information technology and the boom in social media provide firms with easy access to the data of consumers’ preferences and their social interactions. To characterize marketing resource allocation in networks, this paper develops a game theoretical model that allows for each firm’s own utility, action strategies of other firms and the inner state (self-belief and opinions) of consumers. In this model, firms can sway consumers’ opinions by spending marketing resources among consumers under budget and cost constraints. Each firm competes for the collective preference of consumers in a social network to maximize its utility. We derived the equilibrium strategies theoretically in a connected network and a dispersed network from the constructed model. These reveal that firms should allocate more marketing resources to some of consumers depending on their initial opinions, self-belief and positions in a network. We found that some structures of consumer networks may have an innate dominance for one firm, which can be retained in equilibrium results. This means that network structure can be as a tool for firms to improve their utilities. Furthermore, the sensitivities of budget and cost to the equilibria were analyzed. These results can provide some reference for resource allocation strategies in marketing competition.

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The rapid development of information technology and social media has provided easy access to the vast data on individual preferences and social interactions. Despite a series of problems, such as privacy disclosure and data sensitivity, it cannot be denied that this access also provides beneficial opportunities and convenience for campaigns involving opinion control (e.g. marketing campaigns and political election). The profitability of opinion and the finiteness of individual attention have already spawned extensive competition for individual preferences on social networks. It is necessary to investigate opinion dynamics over social networks in a competitive environment. To this end, this paper develops a novel social network DeGroot model based on competition game (DGCG) to characterize opinion evolution in a competitive opinion dynamics. Social interactions based on trust relationships are captured in the DGCG model. From the model, we then obtain equilibrium results in a stable state of opinion evolution. We also analyse what role relevant factors play in the final consensus and competitive outcomes, including the resource ratio of both contestants, initial opinions, self-confidence and network structure. Theoretical analyses and numerical simulations show that these factors can significantly sway the consensus and even reverse competition outcomes.