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We extend the existing literature on gender differences in competitive behavior by investigating tournament entry choices when a principal decides for an agent. In a laboratory experiment, we randomly assign subjects the role of either principal or agent. The principal decides whether the agent performs a real-effort task under piece-rate or tournament incentives. When deciding, the principal is informed about the agent’s previous performance, age, and residency. Between treatments, we vary whether the principal knows the agent’s gender. In a baseline treatment, we replicate the standard setting in which subjects decide for themselves whether to compete. Our main findings are, first, that there is no gender gap in tournament entry when principals decide for agents as opposed to the baseline treatment. Second, the gender gap closes because more women are made to compete by principals. Third, whereas there is no gender gap in either of the principal treatments, revealing the agent’s gender is associated with higher overall tournament entry rates. Exploratory analyses of principals’ choice determinants reveal a positive effect of preferences to take risks, competitiveness, and confidence in agents’ performances on making agents compete. In addition, we find no difference in how principals evaluate male and female agents’ performances. Finally, we test the efficiency of principals’ competition choices and show that they lead to fewer payoff-maximizing outcomes than when subjects decide for themselves. Additionally, overall tournament performances and winners’ performances are lower when agents are made to compete, but this effect is not robust to controlling for agents’ previous performances. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

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Why choose less money over more when no one is watching? A central tenet of economics is that this behaviour can be explained by intrinsic motivation. But what does intrinsic motivation entail? What encourages it? This paper answers these questions through a Smithian lens: moral motivation includes not only a naturally strong love of praise and dread of blame but also a natural, and stronger, love of being worthy of praise and dread of being worthy of blame, even if neither is necessarily given. I rely on quantitative and qualitative data from economic experiments to illustrate this claim. While the current scholarship on Smith has applied his theory to situations in which our actions either evoke reactions from others or have monetary consequences for them, I extend his insights to receiver games (Tjøtta 2019) and dice-rolling games (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013) aimed at eliciting self-regarding concerns, that is, actions affecting the interests of only ourselves. I argue that these games accentuate the strength of the love of praiseworthiness in guiding behaviour, emphasising its immediate reference to others and foundation in intentions along with outcomes.

This paper contributes to the experimental literature by examining the causal effect of partnerchoice opportunities on the earnings of different cooperative types. We first elicit cooperative types and then randomly assign subjects to a repeated prisoner's dilemma game with either mutual partner choice or random matching. In each round, the individual who fails to attain a partner is excluded from the group. This design allows us to study the causal effect of partner choice on earnings and exclusion. The results from two experiments show that partner choice allows cooperators to outperform free riders, cooperators earn more than free riders, and cooperators are less frequently excluded.

We extend the literature on competitive behaviour by investigating environments in which the choice to compete is not made by an individual themselves, but by someone else. Choosing on behalf of others is an integral part of life and gender may be an important factor in shaping the perceived suitability of individuals for career promotions in competitive environments. We assign subjects either the role of an agent or a principal in an experiment. Agents perform a real effort task and a randomly assigned principal chooses whether the agent performs under a piece rate or tournament incentive scheme. Before making a decision for the agent, we vary whether the principal is informed about the agent's gender or not. Regardless of whether gender is revealed, we find no gender gap in competitiveness when principals are choosing for agents. In terms of determinants of the principals' choices, we observe that expectations about their agent's performance, as well as the principal's own preferences for risk and competitiveness matter for the decision to make others compete. In addition, we replicate existing results reporting that women are less willing to enter the tournament than men when choosing themselves. We compare both decision environments and show that efficiency (defined as average performance and earnings) does not suffer, whereas the winners' performance is lower when principals decide for agents. Taken together, our results suggest that allowing others to decide has the potential to increase the representation of women in competitive situations, many of which resemble the labour market.

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