The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Macedonian model of power sharing in all 25 years of Macedonian independence, democracy, and pluralism with the application of the descriptive and comparative methodological approach. During this time, the Macedonian political system went through two stages: the 1991-2001 period, when there was a parliamentary model of democracy, with symbolic inclusion of the Albanian political elite in the executive branches; as well as the period following the 2001 Conflict, which ended with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which, in turn, introduced a hybrid model, containing elements of Westminster (parliamentarian) and consensual (consociational) democracy. This hybrid character of the system still defines the Macedonian political model as ambivalent. It should not be ignored that in this entire period of the quarter of a century of Macedonian independence, there were some ideas of additional elements of consociation in Macedonian political system. Hence, one aspect under analysis in this paper is the many ideas for the future of the Macedonian model of power sharing.

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Late last year, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) marked 25 years since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). This Agreement ended the country's brutal ethnic war . The established political system in Dayton was qualified as a classic consociational agreement but from the new wave. It provided consensual power-sharing between the political elites of the three constituent peoples -the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, including in the collective three-member Presidency. The collective form of the BiH Presidency was not an innovation in peace negotiations under US-mediation in Dayton, but an institution rooted in Yugoslav traditions. Therefore, in this paper, first, an overview of the development of the institution collective head of state in the political system of BiH will be given. Then it will be crossed to the main goal of this analysis -the problematic aspects in the election regulations regarding the election of its members, above all the Croatian, as well as the issue of passive suffrage, including for the so-called "unconstitutional" peoples. Finally, certain ideas for overcoming these problems that exist in the constitutional solutions and provisions of the BiH Electoral Code will be sublimated. Hence the main thesis of this paper is that the electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in terms of the presidential elections, a quarter-century after Dayton, insufficiently and poorly reflects the constitutional, legal, national, political and ethnic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The constitution is the heart of every nation, and because of its unique, complete and prevailing nature, modifying it cannot be simple. Hence, the term constitutional rigidity which provides for the protection of the constitution from changes or makes rendering modification of the same more difficult has been introduced in science. The subject of interest in this paper is the degree of constitutional rigidity in some of the countries with consociational democracy. These are countries in which the building of a stable constitutional order and its maintenance is a challenge, since in this type of states; there is some form of ethnic and cultural diversity. In the past few decades, the international community has been seriously involved in the state building process. This often involved creating new constitutions with consociational elements in some postconflict and deeply divided societies such as -Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Macedonia, and Kosovo. It is precisely the question of the constitutional rigidity in these three newly created consociations that forms the subject of analysis in this paper.

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