Populism is on the rise in many countries. Scholars have stated that it is characteristic for political populism to describe society as a fundamental struggle between an allegedly virtuous people and political elites which are portrayed negatively. This anti-elitist sentiment not only targets politicians, however, but also other representatives of the alleged establishment—including scientists and scholarly institutions. But the specifics of such science-related populism have not yet been conceptualized. We aim to do so, integrating scholarship on political populism, the “participatory turn,” and alternative epistemologies. We propose to conceptualize science-related populism as a set of ideas which suggests that there is a morally charged antagonism between an (allegedly) virtuous ordinary people and an (allegedly) unvirtuous academic elite, and that this antagonism is due to the elite illegitimately claiming and the people legitimately demanding both science-related decision-making sovereignty and truth-speaking sovereignty.

Researchers, policy makers and science communicators have become increasingly been interested in factors that affect public’s trust in science. Recently, one such potentially important driving factor has emerged, the COVID-19 pandemic. Have trust in science and other science-related beliefs changed in Germany from before to during the pandemic? To investigate this, we re-analyzed data from a set of representative surveys conducted in April, May, and November 2020, which were obtained as part of the German survey Science Barometer, and compared it to data from the last annual Science Barometer survey that took place before the pandemic, (in September 2019). Results indicate that German’s trust in science increased substantially after the pandemic began and slightly declined in the months thereafter, still being higher in November 2020 than in September 2019. Moreover, trust was closely related to expectations about how politics should handle the pandemic. We also find that increases of trust were most pronounced among the higher-educated. But as the pandemic unfolded, decreases of trust were more likely among supporters of the populist right-wing party AfD. We discuss the sustainability of these dynamics as well as implications for science communication.

Populism typically pits political elites against “the virtuous people.” A distinct variant of populism (“science-related populism”) extends beyond politics, targeting academic elites and suggesting they ignore people’s common sense and will. Individual endorsement of such a worldview (“science-related populist attitudes”) has been conceptualized but not yet measured. Hence, we developed the SciPop Scale, a survey instrument to measure science-related populist attitudes. We tested 17 survey items in a first representative survey and developed an 8-item scale. We then tested German, French, and Italian versions of this scale in a second representative survey, employing confirmatory factor analysis, Item Response Theory, and external validity tests. Findings show that the SciPop Scale is a robust and reliable measure of populist demands toward science.

Scientists (and science as a whole) provide evidence and advice for societal problem solving and collective decision-making. For this advice to be heard, the public must be willing to trust science, where “trust” means that one can confidently expect science to provide reliable knowledge and evidence, even if one’s understanding of science is bounded. According to the sociological and psychological literature, citizens’ basic attitudes toward, experiences with, and perceived trustworthiness of the trustee serve as antecedents of trust. From this, we developed a model for the public’s trust in science, and we tested this model in a nationally representative survey in Switzerland (N = 1,050). The analysis reveals that trust in science was best predicted by positivistic attitudes toward science (β = 0.33) and to a lesser extent by trustworthiness assessments of scientists (β = 0.24). Experiences with science did not predict trust in science (β = 0.07). These results suggest that stable basic attitudes toward science and its role in society are grounds on which trust in science can be built.

Several meta-analytical attempts to reproduce results of empirical research have failed in recent years, prompting scholars and news media to diagnose a “replication crisis” and voice concerns about science losing public credibility. Others, in contrast, hoped replication efforts could improve public confidence in science. Yet nationally representative evidence backing these concerns or hopes is scarce. We provide such evidence, conducting a secondary analysis of the German “Science Barometer” (“Wissenschaftsbarometer”) survey. We find that most Germans are not aware of the “replication crisis.” In addition, most interpret replication efforts as indicative of scientific quality control and science’s self-correcting nature. However, supporters of the populist right-wing party AfD tend to believe that the “crisis” shows one cannot trust science, perhaps using it as an argument to discredit science. But for the majority of Germans, hopes about reputational benefits of the “replication crisis” for science seem more justified than concerns about detrimental effects.