This new volume sheds new light on current monetary issues, in particular the debate on monetary policymaking, by blending theoretical economic analysis, history of economics, and historical case studies. Throughout the book, we demonstrate to what extent monetary policy is -and has always been -featured by an internal (a price level goal for instance) vs external (exchange rate anchoring or financial disturbances) stability dilemma, in which the use of discretionary power is an indispensable tool to face it. This thesis is fully relevant with recent features of monetary policy study both in theory and in practice.A discretionary monetary policy refers to cases in which the central bank is free to change its policy actions or key instruments when the need arises, whilst a monetary policy rule can be defined as a commitment from (independent) central banks to reach one or several objective(s) by way of systematic policy actions. This book uses case studies from France and Sweden, and places them in the context of Keynes' argument from his 1923 'Tract on Monetary Reforms', to support the argument that the use of discretionary practices within a monetary policy rule (such as in the gold standard era) is the best approach. This book takes an innovative approach in combining a theoretical analysis (mainly the work of New Neoclassical Synthesis throughout Woodford's model) a history of economic thought analysis (based on the monetary works from Wicksell, Cassel and Keynes) and an historical study of central bank practices both in France (based on Bank of France archive materials) and in Sweden. The final section of the book explores the debate on monetary policy rule in light of the 2008 financial crisis. As such, the book provides a unique synthesis that will be of interest not only to scholars of history of economic thought and economic theory, but also to anyone with an interest in monetary economics and contemporary monetary policy.

This book written by Robert Shiller and George Akerlof deals with our misunderstanding of the last crisis inherited from the collapse of the subprime market. Despite some precursor signs, nobody expected it. According to the authors, the last crisis (and the resulting recession) appeared unexpected because we always neglect the importance of animal spirit and more generally the place of human being in the economic theories.Akerlof and Shiller aim at restoring 'from the intellectual history bin' (p. 6) the (old) Keynesian concept of animal spirit in order to improve our understanding of the last global crisis. Of course, the book, as many others, deals with the current recession, however it can be distinguished from other works because it offers a normative perspective about the way of developing economic theories.Beyond the scope of the book, Akerlof and Shiller claim for a theoretical revolution in economic theory. As Keynes reminded us in 1936, academics and policymakers should restore the place of individual psychology (even if it looks irrational) if we want to understand how economic phenomena works and then improve our ability to forecast the potential emergence of a crisis. In this perspective, Akerlof and Shiller use the contributions developed in cognitive psychology and behavioural economics.As they suggested in the title of their book, the authors emphasize the key concept of 'animal spirit'. By animal spirit one should understand 'the state of mind which is underlied by any intellectual and emotional

Myrdal's works are usually analysed with a dual and separated point of view: on the one hand the methodological papers concerning the value problem and based on a strong non neutrality thesis ; on the other part the theoretical analysis concerning monetary theory and policy, with a Wicksellian filiation. In fact both the dimensions are strongly connected by a common way: the application of the Hägerström's Swedish guillotine between is and ought, but also the construction of a bridge between economic science and political views on social engineering and economic policy. Myrdal wants to address this problem: how economic science can become politically relevant? This paper analyses two stages of that unique project: the proposition of a "technology of economics" (1930), and the selection process for"a norm for monetary policy" (1939). It shows that Myrdal distorts an initial end and means scheme by proposing some intermediary concepts between positive and normative fields. From a theoretical and statistical framework and an explicit value judgment these concepts enable to elaborate an iterative tree of selection of a specific monetary policy. If the Myrdal's project encounters difficulties in conciliating a non-cognitivist thesis with economic prescriptions and in proposing a tractable method, it remains an important benchmark for the analysis of the links between positive and normative views concerning monetary policy.

In the aftermath of the sovereign debt criss, open-market interventions prevailed within the central bank's policy answers known under the label unconventional monetary policy measures. During interwar period, France was an isolated case, among the leading countries, by everlastingly rejecting open-market operations in its monetary policy toolset. The present study analyzes the French monetary policy history by explaining why Bank of France had been so old-fashioned in monetary policymaking for too long time. Moreover, the article provides an explanation of the latter point by raising five major arguments of explanation : (1) the irrelevancy of the French interwar monetary reforms which enabled the Bank of France to conduct open-market operations per se; (2) the French conservatism throughout the insiders' view from the Bank of France leaders (not only governors and deputy governors, but also the General Council's members at the head of the French central bank); (3) the legacy of a metallist vision, embodied by Charles Rist, within the French economists of that time (4) the negative public opinion regarding open-market operations which were seen as being an inflationist public debt financing instrument and lastly (5) the unfair competition that occurred between the discounting operations and the open-market operations in the Bank of France's balance sheet.