Empirical/Applied Theory seminars for helpful comments. We thank the Maryland ACLU for providing us with data and information. Persico and Todd are grateful to the NSF for support under #SBR-9905564 and #SBR-9730688, respectively. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork-barrel spending. We compare a winner-take-all system—where all the spoils go to the winner—to a proportional system—where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote. In a winner-take-all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable. We then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency. (JEL D82, L15)

A new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits. If these programs are valuable, a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised. We argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century Britain is consistent with our model.

for helpful conversations. We are grateful to the editor, Steve Levitt, and to an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions that greatly improved the paper. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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