Over the last three decades many Western European social democratic parties have been challenged by populist radical right parties. The growth and success of parties on the right flank of the party system represents a triple challenge to the social democrats: they increase the salience of issues traditionally ‘owned’ by the right; they appeal to working‐class voters who traditionally support the centre left; and they may facilitate the formation of centre‐right governments. This article explores social democratic parties' strategic options in the face of this challenge, and tests the widespread assumption that the centre‐left parties respond by taking a tougher stance on issues related to immigration and integration. Comparative analysis of developments in Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway reveals significant variation in the substance, scope and pace of the strategic responses of their social democratic parties. And it suggests that those responses are influenced not only by the far right but also by the reactions of mainstream centre‐right parties and by parties on their left (and liberal) flank. Internal disunity, potential or actual, is also an important factor.

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International security debates surrounding the European Union (EU) energy supply challenge commonly invoke the need for more EU hard power À e.g. getting tough on Russia or engaging directly with other exporters. This article investigates whether what might be labelled 'soft power with a hard edge' instead amounts to a consistent policy strategy for the EU. The central argument is that the EU has turned a weakness into strength, and developed a set of tools that sharpen the way soft power is exercised in the energy sector. The article explores how soft power affects companies that 'come and play' on the EU market: the rules of the Single European Market (SEM) and how they affect external firms. It also assesses the long reach of the SEM: both the gravitational 'pull' the SEM exerts in the 'near aboard', and the EU's 'push' to facilitate the development of midstream infrastructure and upstream investment. The conclusion is that the EU regulatory state is emerging as an international energy actor in its own right. It limits the ways states like Russia can use state firms in the geopolitical game; and it exports its model into the near abroad, thus stabilizing energy supply and transit routes.

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In the academic literature, Hungary and Poland are often cited as paradigmatic cases of democratic backsliding. However, as the backsliding narrative gained traction, the term has been applied to the rest of the post-communist region, including the Czech Republic and Slovakia. We suggest that this diagnosis is in part based on conceptual stretching, and set out to rescue the concept as an analytical tool. We then assess the extent of backsliding in the four Visegrád countries, explaining backsliding (and the relative lack of it) in terms of motive, opportunity, and the strength or weakness of opposing or constraining forces. We conclude that the situation is not as desperate as some commentators would have it: democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland was contingent on a few exceptional factors, and EU leaders therefore need not be paralysed by the fear of contagion when they contemplate forceful action against backsliding member states.