Since gaining independence, a number of African governments have responded to protect citizens from drought-induced threats of famine. Government relief has either involved limited disbursements of food aid and large income restoring labour-intensive public works programme for the able bodied (labour-based relief), or the universal distribution of free food aid (free food aid). This paper examines why some African governments select policies of universal food relief, while others adopt food-for-work or work-for-cash programmes. Through the use of the concept of the vulnerability of political incumbency, I explore the factors that shape policy selection by political leaderships. This idea is then tested in Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe. In find that that the political status of incumbents determines whether government relief comes in the form of universal aid or labour-based relief.

How do elites play a role in crafting polarization? And what effects do elite-led conflicts have on democracy and mass politics? To examine these questions, we compare two separate episodes of party-based polarization in Zimbabwe, from 1980 to 1987 and from 2000 to 2008. Each of these moments of polarization ended in an elite power-sharing settlement, but a comparison of the two moments yields insights about both the causes of polarization and its effects. We find that the episodes of polarization were rooted in elite instrumentalization of conflict. They differed, however, in the extent to which they activated foundational myths and built larger master cleavages. We suggest that the latter episode conforms more closely to McCoy, Rahman, and Somer’s pernicious polarization, which we argue is marked by deeper societal penetration and segregation than other forms of political polarization and is also less amenable to resolution.

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