Recent contributions have questioned the credibility of quantitative communication research. While questionable research practices are believed to be widespread, evidence for this claim is primarily derived from other disciplines. Before change in communication research can happen, it is important to document the extent to which QRPs are used and whether researchers are open to the changes proposed by the so-called open science agenda. We conducted a large survey among authors of papers published in the top-20 journals in communication science in the last ten years (N=1039). A non-trivial percent of researchers report using one or more QRPs. While QRPs are generally considered unacceptable, researchers perceive QRPs to be common among their colleagues. At the same time, we find optimism about the use of open science practices in communication research. We end with a series of recommendations outlining what journals, institutions and researchers can do moving forward.

Recent contributions have questioned the credibility of quantitative communication research. While questionable research practices (QRPs) are believed to be widespread, evidence for this belief is, primarily, derived from other disciplines. Therefore, it is largely unknown to what extent QRPs are used in quantitative communication research and whether researchers embrace open research practices (ORPs). We surveyed first and corresponding authors of publications in the top-20 journals in communication science. Many researchers report using one or more QRPs. We find widespread pluralistic ignorance: QRPs are generally rejected, but researchers believe they are prevalent. At the same time, we find optimism about the use of open science practices. In all, our study has implications for theories in communication that rely upon a cumulative body of empirical work: these theories are negatively affected by QRPs but can gain credibility if based upon ORPs. We outline an agenda to move forward as a discipline.

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Objective: Past research in (political) psychology has put forward that individual differences in psychological needs shape ideology. Most evidence supporting this claim is cross-sectional. Two previous longitudinal studies showed preliminary evidence that childhood personality traits linked to negativity bias correlate with political ideology in adulthood, yet these studies have limitations. We add depth and breadth to the study of the childhood personality-adult ideology link with additional data, measures, and measurement approaches.Methods: We report the results from two longitudinal studies (combined N=13,822) conducted in the UK that measure personality traits in childhood (5-11 years old) and political ideology from puberty (age 16) to early (age 26) and middle adulthood (age 42).Results: We find very weak and inconsistent evidence that childhood personality traits related to negativity bias are directly associated with general conservatism, social conservatism, or economic conservatism across different stages of adulthood. Across the board, Bayes Factors most often indicate strong evidence for the null hypothesis.Conclusion: We offer evidence that the results of previous research are not as robust or as consistent as many scholars in the extant literature presume. Our findings call for more, not less, research on the link between childhood personality and political ideology.

Families are not only the first institution ever created, they are also, for most people, the first institution ever encountered. The preindustrial family structure, which was a function of local ecology and cooperation needs, instilled family members with different values, such as trust in strangers and respect for elders. These values passed through generations and, as we show in three studies, impact today's political attitudes and policies. First, using surveys of second-generation immigrants representing roughly 180 ethnicities living in 32 European countries, we show that the tighter kinship structure of a person's ancestors predicts right-wing cultural attitudes. Among those who are less engaged in politics, tighter ancestral kinship structure also predicts left-wing economic attitudes. In a second study, we control for country-level differences by comparing ethnic groups within countries and find that ancestral kinship strength predicts right-wing cultural attitudes but not left-wing economic attitudes. Finally, in a third study, we examine the policy implications of ancestral kinship. We show that stronger country-level ancestral kinship strength also increases anti-LGBT policies and welfare spending. Finally, we examine whether value systems link preindustrial kinship with modern political attitudes. In total, this work indicates that our political beliefs are rooted in the value systems and familial institutions created by our forebears.