This paper examines whether managers can reduce the detrimental effects of information overload by spreading out, or temporally smoothing, disclosures. In our initial set of analyses, we attempt to identify managerial smoothing behavior. We find that when there are multiple disclosures for the same event date, managers, on average, spread the disclosures out over several days. We also find that managers are more likely to delay a disclosure (from its event date) when there has been a previous disclosure made within the three days before the event date. Finally, we show that managers are more likely to engage in disclosure smoothing when disclosures are longer, when the information environment is more robust, when firm information is complex, when uncertainty is high, and when disclosure news is more positive. In our second set of analyses, we examine whether there are market benefits to disclosure smoothing. Using two different measures of disclosure smoothing, we find that smoothing is associated with increased liquidity, reduced stock price volatility and increased analyst forecast accuracy. Finally, in additional analyses, we show that managers are less likely to engage in smoothing when they have negative news; they also release good news more quickly after bad news. Combined, our results suggest managers smooth disclosures and the smoothing is associated with several beneficial market outcomes.

A large body of literature finds that cross-listing is associated with capital market benefits. However, evidence also suggests that these benefits are mostly temporary. In this paper, I investigate whether communication with U.S. investors helps non-U.S. firms maintain the capital market benefits of U.S. listings. I find that investor communication mitigates the post cross-listing decline in valuation documented by prior studies. I also find that communication choices explain variation in the valuation, cost of capital and stock liquidity of cross-listed firms in the long run. These results are robust to concerns about potential self-selection bias and are stronger for firms from countries with lower corruption risk and fewer cultural differences from U.S. culture. Lastly, I compare the valuation of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. My findings suggest that a significant portion of the cross-listing valuation premium is associated with the investor communication practices of these firms. Firms that cross-list in the U.S. but do not communicate with U.S. investors are not valued at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms from the same country. Overall, my results are consistent with investor communication being an important condition for firms to maintain the long-run benefits of cross-listing. by management can decrease information asymmetry and mitigate international visibility issues, increasing stock liquidity and market valuation (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and O'Hara 2004). In this paper, I address a gap in the literature and focus on the relation between the benefits of cross-listing and four channels of management-investor communication, namely corporate access events, conference calls, press releases, and management forecasts. Prior literature suggests two main explanations for the capital market outcomes of crosslisting: increased investor recognition associated with a broader shareholder base (the investor recognition hypothesis) and better investor protection (the bonding hypothesis). Both explanations are related to improvements in the information environment of firms. I argue that foreign firms that do not meet the expectations of U.S. investors and analysts regarding the frequency and form of corporate communication may not be able to keep the long-run benefits of a U.S. listing because they are either unable to maintain investor recognition or to fulfill bonding expectations. If a firm cross-lists, attracting initial international visibility, but it is unable to maintain this visibility, most of the long-run benefits of cross-listing will fail to materialize. Similarly, crosslisted firms that do not communicate with U.S. investors may not be able to effectively "bond" themselves to the U.S. market institutions because of residual information asymmetry issues. Richer information environments would allow U.S. market participants to better monitor managerial behavior, increasing the bonding effects. I posit that the management communication strategies of non-U.S. firms focu...

We investigate whether institutional ownership (IO) plays a role in transmitting systemic risk through banks. We find robust evidence suggesting that IO is positively associated with future systemic risk. We find this relationship is stronger during economic downturns at the economy-wide level, as well as for banks demonstrating greater capital needs. Our results also suggest a trading mechanism through which active, and transient institutions in particular, play a role in propagating systemic risk. We find the relationship exists when there is both overlapping and non-overlapping ownership of banks, and the result is concentrated when there are low monitoring incentives for institutional owners. Furthermore, we find disclosure may play a role in mitigating the transmission of systemic risk by institutional investors. Overall, our results should be of interest to regulators, who have called for institutional investors to play a larger role in bank monitoring, and more broadly to the academic literature that tends to assume the benefits of IO without adequate consideration of the potential costs.

Este trabalho mensurou o impacto informacional, medido pelo retorno anormal do preço das ações de companhias abertas brasileiras, ocasionado pelas apresentações gerenciais em reuniões públicas organizadas pela Associação dos Analistas e Profissionais de Investimento do Mercado de Capitais (Apimec). Utilizando a metodologia de estudo de evento, foram analisados os retornos anormais das ações de 160 empresas que realizaram 739 reuniões entre 2005 e 2009. Os resultados encontrados sugerem que, em média, as informações geradas nesses eventos acarretaram retornos anormais pequenos no período analisado. Tal achado pode ser fruto tanto do baixo impacto informacional desses eventos quanto da possível dificuldade dos participantes das reuniões de perceberem essas informações como relevantes. A principal contribuição desta pesquisa é demonstrar que as reuniões Apimec constituem um momento em que as relações da empresa com os investidores e analistas podem ser iniciadas e fortalecidas, mas em que informações novas não são apresentadas. Essa constatação demonstra que a condução das reuniões pelas companhias está em conformidade com as recomendações dos órgãos reguladores brasileiros, as quais indicam que nas reuniões públicas devem ser comentadas apenas informações previamente divulgadas. Outros meios de divulgação de informações, como fatos relevantes, comunicados ao mercado, teleconferências, entre outros, podem ser tão eficientes na distribuição ampla e simultânea de informações aos diversos agentes do mercado, que resta para as reuniões realmente o papel de oportunizar um maior conhecimento e compreensão da empresa pelo mercado e do mercado pela empresa. Essa construção de compreensão mútua pode trazer valor nas relações das companhias com os investidores no longo prazo, mas não acarretam, em média, impactos informacionais de curto prazo.

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