Purpose Since the late 1990s, developing countries have been encouraged by international financial organisations to adopt a shareholder primacy corporate governance model. It was anticipated that in an increasingly globalised financial market, countries which introduced corporate governance practices that favour investors would gain a comparative advantage and attract more capital leading to financial market growth. This paper aims to empirically test this hypothesis. Design/methodology/approach The present research paper quantitatively investigates whether adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance norms has had any impact on the growth of the financial market, focusing on nineteen developing countries between 1995 and 2014. Time series indices are prepared for corporate governance regulations, financial market development along with three control indices. Then a lagged multilevel regression between these indices is used to investigate the strength of causality between the adoption of pro-shareholder corporate governance and the growth of the financial market. Findings The research paper finds that shifting towards a shareholder primacy model in corporate governance has a very small effect on growth of financial market in developing countries. Overall the financial, economic and technological controls have much more impact on the growth of financial markets. Originality/value This paper conclusively ends the discussion as to whether change in corporate governance has any impact on financial market growth of a country. The papers uses Bayesian econometric model. The paper thus signals the end of LLSV led question as to whether law can affect finance.
Purpose For the past two and half decades, there has been a marked shift in the corporate governance regulations around the world. The change is more remarkable in developing countries where countries with little or no corporate governance regime have adopted “world class” standards. While there can be a debate on whether law in books actually translates into law in action, in the meantime it might be interesting to analyse the law in books to understand how the corporate governance regime has evolved in the past 20 years. This paper quantitatively tracks 21 countries, most of them being developing and emerging economies, over a period of 20 years. The period covers 1995 to 2014; thus, it traverses the pre and post crisis period in 1999 and 2008. Thus, the paper also provides a snapshot of the macrolegal changes that the countries engage in hoping to stave off the next crisis. The paper uses over 50 parameters modelled on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The paper confirms the suspicion that corporate governance norms around the developing economies are converging on shareholder primacy end of the continuum. The rate of convergence was highest just before the financial crisis of 2008 and has since then slowed down. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses data collected from experts. They filled up detailed questionnaire which quizzed them on the rules relating to corporate governance norms in their country and asked them to retrospectively check their data every five years for the past 20 years. This provided an excellent overview as to how the law has evolved in the past two decades on corporate governance. The data were then tabulated using a scoring sheet and then was put together using item response theory (IRT) which is a Bayesian method similar to factor analysis. The paper then follows a comparative approach using heatmaps to analyse the evolution of corporate governance in developing countries. Findings Corporate governance norms around the developing economies are converging on shareholder primacy end of the continuum. The rate of convergence was highest just before the financial crisis of 2008 and has since then slowed down. Originality/value This is the first time that corporate governance panel data analysis has been carried out on top developing countries across so many parameters for such a long period. This paper also uses Bayesian IRT modelling to analyse the evolution which is novel in its approach especially in the corporate governance literature. The paper thus provides a clear view on the evolution of corporate governance norms and how they are converging on a particular ideology.
The present study sheds light on the comparative experiences of the two countries originating from differing legal systems and describes how their codes and practices affect the publicly listed firms’ performance. It investigates the linkages between Research and Development (R&D) expenditures, Board characteristics and firm performance using a sample of Irish and Spanish firms for the period 2005–2014. To do this, the study uses ROA and Tobin’s Q as proxies for financial performance; and board size, non-executive directors, female representation and CEO duality as board structure characteristics; and R&D expenditure volatility, employing different techniques that include OLS, fixed effects model and Quantile regression model. The difference-in-difference model is used to verify the significance of robustness of relationships considering the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock. The descriptive statistics suggests a comparability of boards’ independence for the Spanish- and Irish-listed firms. Although the Spanish firms are less dual than Irish firms, the results are comparable on the association between CEO duality and firm performance. The findings of Spanish-listed firms on the relationship between increase and decrease in the R&D expenditures volatility and performance support the creative–destructive perspective that suggests effective governance in funding allocation to R&D.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version
Purpose This paper aims to address the evolution of corporate governance in Germany with a particular regard to whether there can be observed a gradual convergence to a shareholder primacy corporate governance system. Design/methodology/approach To investigate a potential shift of the German corporate governance system to an Anglo-American tiled corporate governance system, the authors have empirically assessed on a polynomial base 52 separate company and corporate governance variables for 20 years (1995-2014). Findings This research suggests that a gradual convergence has taken place prior to the global financial crisis. However, the results suggest that the convergence process experienced a slowdown in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, which may be linked to the stability of the German corporate governance system during the global financial crisis and the political environment during this time. Originality/value This paper contributes to the research by not only analysing the development of the German corporate governance system but also identifying new reasons for this development and explaining why a new convergence process may be observed in the future again.
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