In four experiments, we tested the community-of-knowledge hypothesis, that people fail to distinguish their own knowledge from other people's knowledge. In all the experiments, despite the absence of any actual explanatory information, people rated their own understanding of novel natural phenomena as higher when they were told that scientists understood the phenomena than when they were told that scientists did not yet understand them. In Experiment 2, we found that this occurs only when people have ostensible access to the scientists' explanations; the effect does not occur when the explanations exist but are held in secret. In Experiment 3, we further ruled out two classes of alternative explanations (one appealing to task demands and the other proposing that judgments were mediated by inferences about a phenomenon's understandability). In Experiment 4, we ruled out the possibility that the effect could be attributed to a pragmatic inference.
Public attitudes that are in opposition to scientific consensus can be disastrous and include rejection of vaccines and opposition to climate change mitigation policies. Five studies examine the interrelationships between opposition to expert consensus on controversial scientific issues, how much people actually know about these issues, and how much they think they know. Across seven critical issues that enjoy substantial scientific consensus, as well as attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccines and mitigation measures like mask wearing and social distancing, results indicate that those with the highest levels of opposition have the lowest levels of objective knowledge but the highest levels of subjective knowledge. Implications for scientists, policymakers, and science communicators are discussed.
Exposure to even subtle forms of misleading information can significantly alter memory for past events. Memory distortion due to misinformation has been linked to faulty reconstructive processes during memory retrieval and the reactivation of brain regions involved in the initial encoding of misleading details (cortical reinstatement). The current study investigated whether warning participants about the threat of misinformation can modulate cortical reinstatement during memory retrieval and reduce misinformation errors. Participants watched a silent video depicting a crime (original event) and were given an initial test of memory for the crime details. Then, participants listened to an auditory narrative describing the crime in which some original details were altered (misinformation). Importantly, participants who received a warning about the reliability of the auditory narrative either before or after exposure to misinformation demonstrated less susceptibility to misinformation on a final test of memory compared to unwarned participants. Warned and unwarned participants also demonstrated striking differences in neural activity during the final memory test. Compared to participants who did not receive a warning, participants who received a warning (regardless of its timing) demonstrated increased activity in visual regions associated with the original source of information as well as decreased activity in auditory regions associated with the misleading source of information. Stronger visual reactivation was associated with reduced susceptibility to misinformation, whereas stronger auditory reactivation was associated with increased susceptibility to misinformation. Together, these results suggest that a simple warning can modulate reconstructive processes during memory retrieval and reduce memory errors due to misinformation.
The theory that health behaviors spread through social groups implies that efforts to control COVID-19 through vaccination will succeed if people believe that others in their groups are getting vaccinated. But “others” can refer to many groups, including one’s family, neighbors, fellow city or state dwellers, or copartisans. One challenge to examining these understudied distinctions is that many factors may confound observed relationships between perceived social norms (what people believe others do) and intended behaviors (what people themselves will do), as there are plausible common causes for both. We address these issues using survey data collected in the United States during late fall 2020 (
n
= 824) and spring 2021 (
n
= 996) and a matched design that approximates pair-randomized experiments. We find a strong relationship between perceived vaccination social norms and vaccination intentions when controlling for real risk factors (e.g., age), as well as dimensions known to predict COVID-19 preventive behaviors (e.g., trust in scientists). The strength of the relationship declines as the queried social group grows larger and more heterogeneous. The relationship for copartisans is second in magnitude to that of family and friends among Republicans but undetectable for Democrats. Sensitivity analysis shows that these relationships could be explained away only by an unmeasured variable with large effects (odds ratios between 2 and 15) on social norms perceptions and vaccination intentions. In addition, a prediction from the “false consensus” view that intentions cause perceived social norms is not supported. We discuss the implications for public health policy and understanding social norms.
Objective
To assess the extent to which political ideology affects COVID-19 preventive behaviors and related beliefs and attitudes in the U.S.
Methods
Two surveys, one using a convenience sample and another using a nationally representative sample, were conducted in September and November 2020, respectively. Multiple regressions compared political ideology with identified COVID-19 risk factors and demographics as well as knowledge measures. Surveys were followed by a review of the emerging COVID-19 behavioral literature (completed in January 2021) to assess the frequency of ideological effects in publicly reported data.
Results
In the survey data, political ideology was a significant predictor for all dependent variables in both surveys, and the strongest predictor for most of them. Out of 141 estimates from 44 selected studies, political ideology was a significant predictor of responses in 112 (79%) and showed the largest effect on COVID-19-related measures in close to half of these estimates (44%).
Conclusions
This study reinforces previous research that found partisan differences in engaging in behaviors with long-term health consequences by showing that these ideologically-driven differences manifest in situations where the possibility of severe illness or death is immediate and the potential societal impact is significant. The substantial implications for public health research and practice are both methodological and conceptual.
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