Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important element of the global economy and a central component of economic development strategies of both developed and developing countries. Numerous scholars theorize that the economic benefits of attracting multinational corporations come at tremendous political costs, arguing that democratic political systems attract lower levels of international investment than their authoritarian counterparts. Using both cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional tests of the determinants of FDI for more than 100 countries, I generate results that are inconsistent with these dire predictions. Democratic political systems attract higher levels of FDI inflows both across countries and within countries over time. Democratic countries are predicted to attract as much as 70 percent more FDI than their authoritarian counterparts. In a final empirical test, I examine how democratic institutions affect country credibility by empirically analyzing the link between democracy and sovereign debt risk for about eighty countries from 1980 to 1998. These empirical tests challenge the conventional wisdom on the preferences of multinationals for authoritarian regimes.

Political economists point to level of economic development, poverty and income inequality as the most important determinants of political regimes. We present empirical evidence suggesting a robust and negative correlation between the presence of a sizeable natural resource sector and the level of democracy in Africa. We argue that not only is resource abundance is an important determinant of democratic transition, but also partially determines the success of democratic consolidation in Africa. The results illuminate the fact that post-cold war democratic reforms have been successful only in resource poor countries such as Benin, Mali, and Madagascar. We argue that resourcerich countries such as Nigeria and Gabon can become democratic only if they introduce strong mechanisms of vertical and horizontal accountability within the state.

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