This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of 'self-criticism', in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of selfcriticism. I then argue that this evidence allows Reid and Peirce a way out of the dilemma between dogmatism and skepticism regarding the justification of such principles, insofar as they are epistemically, and not solely practically, justified.The historical connections between Thomas Reid and American pragmatism have not garnered much attention, though there is a growing literature on the pragmatic elements of Reid's epistemology. This neglect is surprising because early pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce was a great admirer of Reid. Peirce even refers to Reid as 'that subtle and well-balanced intellect', and calls his own approach 'critical common-sensism', suggesting at least a nominal connection to Reid (Peirce [1905. Moreover, as we shall see, the connections between Reid and the pragmatist tradition are more than nominal, and appreciation of Peirce's approach to first principles elucidates Reid's pragmatist commitments.Those philosophers who have attempted to elucidate the connections between Thomas Reid and pragmatism have focused on Reid's epistemology, particularly
Moral particularism, broadly understood, is the position that morality resists codifi cation into a set of rules or principles. 1 Jonathan Dancy, particularism's main contemporary proponent, maintains that there are few, if any, true moral principles, and that moral reasoning and judgment do not require them. Instead, acts are justifi ed by elements of situations themselves, their salient features, and moral reasoning requires attunement to these features. In rejecting a rule-bound picture of morality, particularists also reject accounts of moral education emphasizing knowledge and application of rules. While Dancy articulates a competing view of competence, his explanation of the possibility of moral education is inadequate, leaving a lacuna in the case for particularism. However, John Dewey articulates a view of competence familiar to contemporary particularism and confronts a similar educational challenge. Here, I contend that Dewey's response provides resources for contemporary particularists.Below, I outline Dancy's view of particularist moral reasoning and his sparse comments regarding education. While particularist moral reasoning requires discerning a situation's salient features, Dancy does not offer an account of moral formation explaining this sensitivity, inviting skepticism about the possibility of particularist education. In response, I call attention to Dewey's recognition of the problem of appreciating salience, the problem of a "mental perspective." Finally, I argue that Dewey's account of habits and their development in traditions enables an account of the possibility of moral education compatible with Dancy's particularism.This sketch offers a key component in particularism's defense. If particularists cannot make sense of the possibility of moral education, that would constitute a serious objection to the view. 2 Because of this potential shortcoming, particularists ought to be eager to draw on a Deweyan framework regarding education. Particularist Moral Reasoning: Justifi cation is NarrativeBefore proceeding to offer a Deweyan avenue for the possibility of particularist education, we need an idea of the goal of this process. As intimated above, Dancy conceives of moral competence differently than his princi-
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