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We study how contingent capital that converts in equity ahead of default affects bank riskshifting. Going concern conversion restores equity value in highly levered states, thus reducing heightened risk incentives. In contrast, conversion at default for traditional bail-inable debt has no effect on endogenous risk. The main beneficial effect comes from reduced leverage at conversion. In contrast to traditional convertible debt, equity dilution under going concern conversion has the opposite effect. The negative effect of dilution is tempered by any value transfer at conversion. We find that CoCo capital may be less risky than bail-inable debt when lower priority is compensated by lower endogenous risk, which is beneficial as a lower bond yield improves incentives. The risk reduction effect of CoCo debt depends critically on the informativeness of the trigger, but is always inferior to pure equity.

Aims To adapt and validate the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) for use in the Russian Federation and countries with Russian-speaking populations by: Methods Systematic review of past use and validation of the Russian-language AUDIT. Interviews to be conducted with experts to identify problems encountered in the use of existing Russian-language AUDIT versions. A pilot study using a revised translation of the Russian-language AUDIT that incorporates country-specific drinking patterns in the Russian Federation. Results and Conclusions The systematic review identified over 60 different Russian-language AUDIT versions without systematic validation studies. The main difficulties encountered with the use of the AUDIT in the Russian Federation were related to the lack of: A revised version of the Russian-language AUDIT was created based on the pilot studies, and was validated in primary healthcare facilities in all regions in 2019/2020.

Research Question The 2008 crisis revealed a surprising amount of risk-taking in very profitable financial institutions. This seems to contradict the traditional predictions of corporate finance models where more profitable firms take less risk, because their shareholders stand to lose more if downside risks realize (Keeley, 1990). Understanding why some of the most profitable financial institutions chose to become exposed to risky market-based instruments on a large scale seems critical for both bank risk management and systemic risk regulation. Contribution In traditional corporate finance models, banks choose the risk of a portfolio of a fixed size. We show that bank risk-taking may take a different form when balance sheet size is a bank's choice. In our model, banks are endowed with a stable 'core business' and choose the size and risk of the market-based investments undertaken alongside their core business. Higher profitability of their core business enables banks to borrow more and engage in risky side activities on a larger scale. Results The model offers predictions that are consistent with some notable patterns of banks' precrisis risk-taking. One pattern is that many banks affected by the crisis were in advanced, rather than developing economies. Our model suggests that risk-taking in profitable banks is more likely when bank leverage constraints are looser, consistent with buoyant credit markets and a pre-crisis weakening of bank capital regulation in many advanced economies. Another pattern is the role of senior funding (e.g. repo) in supporting banks' pre-crisis expansion. Consistent with this evidence, our model confirms that banks' risk-taking in side investments is more severe when these can be financed with senior debt.

Traditional theory suggests that more profitable banks should have lower risk-taking incentives. Then why did many profitable banks choose to invest in untested financial instruments before the crisis, realizing significant losses? We attempt to reconcile theory and evidence. In our setup, banks are endowed with a fixed core business. They take risk by levering up to engage in risky 'side activities'(such as market-based investments) alongside the core business. A more profitable core business allows a bank to borrow more and take side risks on a larger scale, offsetting lower incentives to take risk of given size. Consequently, more profitable banks may have higher risk-taking incentives. The framework is consistent with cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run up to the recent financial crisis.